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BANKING LAW
by
Peter G. Weinstock* and Christopher T. Klimko**

HE savings and loan crisis is a national catastrophe that already has

Tcost

the American taxpayer tens of billions of dollars', resulted in
hundreds of people being sentenced to prison2 and either precipitated
or contributed to the collapse of real estate values in many parts of the country. The economic ramifications of these events shaped much of the litigation in Texas courts, and thus, the development of Banking Law in 1990.

This survey article explores such developments.
I.

SUPERPOWERS

A. ProceduralSuperpowers
A significant amount of litigation during the survey period concerned procedural questions raised when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) or the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) becomes involved in a
case following its appointment as receiver for an insolvent financial
institution.
Removal
a. Time Limits on Removal. MTech Corp. v. FDIC3 addressed the question of the amount of time the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as
receiver of an insolvent bank (FDIC-Receiver), has to remove a state court
case to federal court. 4 FDIC-Receiver had been appointed receiver of the
defendant bank in this action on July 13, 1989, and had removed the case to
federal court on September 8, 1989. 5 MTech Corp. (MTech) challenged the
L

* The author is a member of the Financial Institutions Section of Jenkens & Gilchrist,
P.C. The author lectures and writes frequently on topics concerning financial institutions.
** The author is a member of the Corporate Legal Department of Bank One, Texas,
N.A. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and are
not attributable in any manner to Bank One, Texas, N.A.
1. The anticipated cost to the United States Treasury to resolve the nation's failed thrift
institutions seems to change with each transaction. At November 12, 1990, the administration
estimated that the savings and loan bailout would cost $130 billion dollars without interest.
See House Banking Loses Senior Republican; No Changes to Senate Banking Committee. 55
Banking Rep., Nov. 19, 1990, at 775.
2. According to the November 5, 1990 issue of Fortune, 331 "S&L felons" have been
convicted during the past two years and "scores await trial." Farnham, The S&L Felons, 122
FORTUNE, Nov. 5, 1990, at 90.
3. 729 F. Supp. 1134 (N.D. Tex. 1990)
4. Id. at 1135-36.
5. Id. at 1135.
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removal on the grounds that it was untimely and sought remand of the case
to state court. The MTech court agreed with MTech, holding that the statute governing removal by FDIC-Receiver, 12 U.S.C. section 18196, was subject to the time periods contained in the general removal statute found at 28
U.S.C. section 1446. 7 The court found that FDIC-Receiver had received
several "papers" within the meaning of section 1446(b)8 from which it was
ascertainable that the case was removable on July 18, 1989, and, as a result,
FDIC-Receiver's 30-day removal period under section 1446 commenced on
that date, rendering the removal on September 8, 1989 untimely. 9 In so
holding, the court rejected FDIC-Receiver's argument that the amendment
of section 1819 by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 198910 (FIRREA) made the time periods of section 1446 inapplicable to section 1819 removals and, in their place, imposed a
reasonableness standard upon the timing of such removals. 1 The court
stated that if Congress had sought to insulate FDIC-Receiver from the time
limits of section 1446 it would have explicitly so stated.' 2 Further, the court
6.

12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2) provides:

FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION.(A) In General
Except as provided in subparagraph (D), all suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity to which the Corporation [FDIC], in any capacity, is a party
shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States.
(B) Removal
Except as provided in subparagraph (D), the Corporation may, without bond
or security, remove any action, suit, or proceeding from a State court to the
appropriate United States district court.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1819(b)(2) (1989). Subparagraph (D) provides for exceptions to the deeming
provisions of subparagraph (A) in cases where the FDIC is a party other than a defendant; in
cases where the only issues involve preclosing rights against the institution for which the FDIC
is receiver, or involving obligations owed to depositors, creditors, or stockholders of such institution; or where only interpretation of state law is involved. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1819(2)(D)
(1989). These exceptions did not apply in this case.
7. 729 F. Supp. at 1137. See infra note 8.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within
thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a
copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such
action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons
upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not
required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal
may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from
which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become
removable ...

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988).
9. 729 F. Supp. at 1135-37.
10. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 209, 103 Stat. 183, 216-217 (1989) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1988)).
It. 729 F. Supp. at 1136. Prior to the passage of FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1819 had allowed
FDIC-Receiver to remove cases "by following any procedure for removal now or hereafter in
effect .... ." U.S.C. § 1819 (1988) (current version at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1819 (1989)). Following
amendment by FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1819 allows FDIC-Receiver to remove "any action, suit,
or proceeding from a state court to the appropriate" federal district court. See supra note 6.
12. 729 F. Supp. at 1136.
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observed that nowhere in section 1819 was a reasonableness standard set
forth. 13 FDIC-Receiver's argument was also undercut by the fact that the
argument's logical extension was that no requirement of section 1446 applied
to a section 1819 removal and by the fact that FDIC-Receiver itself acknowledged that section 1446 governed some aspects of the case.14
The MTech case should be contrasted with Resolution Trust Corporation
v. Key 15, which concerned, in part, the applicability of the time requirements
of section 1446 to removals of suits by the RTC. The defendant in Key
alleged that the RTC's removal of the case after its appointment as receiver
for the plaintiff savings association was untimely because the removal occurred after the expiration of the 30-day time limit of section 1446.16 The
court rejected the defendant's contention, noting that the statute authorizing
removal 17 by the RTC contained no reference to general removal procedures
(i.e., section 1446) and, furthermore, spelled out its own specific time limits
for removal.18 Thus, the time limits applicable to removal of a state court
case by the RTC when acting as a conservator or receiver are the 90-day/30day limits stated in the RTC removal statute rather than those found in
section 1446.19 The Key court recognized that it was applying a different
time frame to RTC removals than is applied when FDIC-Receiver seeks to
remove a case. Nonetheless, the court found such a result to be mandated by
the difference in language between section 1819 and that contained in the
20
RTC removal statute.
Matrix Ski Corp. v. FDIC21 affirmed the distinction between the removal
provisions governing FDIC-Receiver and the RTC.22 Matrix Ski filed suit in
state court on January 12, 1990, against an insolvent savings and loan for
which the RTC had been appointed as receiver. The petition was served on
13. Id.

14.
§ 1446.
15.
16.
17.

Id. The FDIC acknowledged filing its notice of removal pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
Id.
733 F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
Id. at 1088. See supra note 8.
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(1)(3) provides in part:
The Corporation [RTC] may, without bond or security, remove any such action, suit, or proceeding from a State court to the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, or if the action, suit, or proceeding arises out of the
actions of the Corporation with respect to an institution for which a conservator
or a receiver has been appointed, the United States district court for the district
where the institution's principal business is located. The removal of any action,
suit, or proceeding shall be instituted(A) not later than 90 days after the date the Corporation is substituted as a
party, or
(B) not later than 30 days after the date suit is filed against the Corporation, if
such suit is filed after the date of enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989.
The Corporation may appeal any order of remand entered by a United States
district court.
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(1)(3) (Supp. 1990).
18. 733 F. Supp. at 1089-90.
19. Id. at 1090.
20. Id. n.6. See also supra note 11.
21. 734 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Tex. 1990).

22. Id. at 765.
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January 16, 1990, and the RTC removed the case on February 16, 1990.23
Under the RTC removal statute, removal of the case was required within 30
days of filing of the suit,24 which 30-day period the RTC exceeded. The
RTC argued, however, that it was able to remove cases pursuant to both
section 1819, which governs removal by the FDIC, and the RTC removal
statute. The RTC reasoned that the FDIC is the statutory manager of the
RTC, and section 1819(b)(2) 25, by its terms, is applicable to all suits to
which the FDIC is a party in any capacity. 26 If section 1819 had governed
in this case, the time limits of section 1446 would have been applicable, 27
and the 30 day time limit of section 1446 would not have begun to run until
the RTC's receipt of the original pleading. Consequently, the RTC's removal would have been timely. 28 The Matrix Ski court rejected the RTC's
position, holding that removals by the FDIC and RTC are governed29by separate and substantially different statutes that yield different results.
MTech, Key and Matrix Ski demonstrate that successful removal of a case
involving a failed financial institution in receivership hinges in large part
upon the identity of the receiver seeking removal. These cases also demonstrate a fairly strict adherence by the courts to the literal provisions of the
removal statutes and their reluctance to expand removal powers beyond
those granted by Congress.
b. Removal After State Court Decision. In FDIC v. Meyerland Co. (In re
Meyerland Co.) 30 a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the ability of the FDIC to remove a state court appellate
proceeding. In analyzing this question, the majority first noted that,
although infrequently exercised, Congress has the power to provide for the
removal of cases on appeal in state courts. 31 The majority also noted that
neither history nor the bare language of section 1819 clearly indicated
whether removal of state appellate cases was permissible under section
1819(b)(2)(B). 32 The majority then analogized the case before it to In re
Savers FederalSavings & Loan Association,33 in which the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit permitted removal by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) of a state court case in which a final judgment had been rendered by the state trial court and no appeal had been filed
but the period for appeal had not yet lapsed. 34 The In re Savers court refused to confine removal to those actions in which no final judgment had
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 764.
See supra note 17.
See supra note 6.
734 F. Supp. at 764.
See supra text accompanying notes 3-14.
734 F. Supp. at 764-65.

29. Id. at 765. The court cited Resolution Trust Corp. v. Key as authority. See supra
notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
30. 910 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1990) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 1259.
32. Id. at 1261.
33. 872 F.2d 963 (11th Cir. 1989).
34. Id. at 965-66; see 910 F.2d at 1262.
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been rendered and stated that if Congress had intended to so limit FSLIC's
removal powers, it could have explicitly so stated. 35 The Meyerland majority noted that in the case before it, as in In re Savers, state appellate proceedings had not been exhausted when removal was sought; consequently, the
majority concluded that the FDIC was entitled to remove the action. 36 The
Meyerland majority also held that the removed proceeding musi be treated
as if it had originated in the federal district court to which the case was
removed. 37 Further, the district court would be required to adopt the state
court judgment as its own.33 The removed
case, as a result, would be on
39
appeal within the federal court system.
In his dissent from the majority's holding in Meyerland,Judge Higginbotham argued that the only state appellate proceedings removable under section 1819(b)(2)(B) are those over which a federal district court may exercise
some original jurisdiction, that is, proceedings that otherwise are removable
under section 1819 and in which relief is available under Rule 60 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 60). 40 The dissent reasoned that
section 1819(b)(2) removal must necessarily be governed by the general removal provisions of section 1441(a) 41 regarding matters with respect to
which section 1819(b)(2) is silent. 42 The dissent then observed that 28
U.S.C. section 1441(a) provides that a case is removable from state court if
the district court has original jurisdiction over it, and argued that the district
court's "rubber stamp" of the state trial court judgment required by the majority opinion does not constitute the exercise of original jurisdiction.4 3 In
the case of removals from a state appellate court governed by section 1819,
the dissent contended that the original jurisdiction of a federal district court
is limited to Rule 60 relief.44
Unlike MTech, Key and Matrix Ski, Meyerland seems to indicate an expansive approach to analyzing the receivers' removal powers. It should also
be noted that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Meyerland
while the other cases were decided by district courts. It may be possible to
reconcile these apparently different approaches by noting that the question
addressed by the Meyerland court could not be resolved by reference to the
35. See 872 F.2d at 966.
36. 910 F.2d at 1262.
37. Id. at 1263.
38. Id.
39. See Id. at 1262-63.
40. Id. at 1263 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). FeD. R. Civ. P. 60 provides that a judgment may be set aside on such grounds as mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending. For purposes of removal under this chapter,
the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988).
42. 910 F.2d at 1264.
43. Id. at 1265.
44. See id. at 1267.
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plain language of the governing statute and also had policy implications absent from the other cases.
c. Remand. A final decision concerning removal of cases by the receivers of insolvent financial institutions is PernieBailey Drilling Co. v. FDIC,45
which involved an appeal by the FDIC of a federal district court's remand of
the case to state court. Pernie Bailey Drilling Company (Pernie Bailey) sued
First RepublicBank Houston, N.A. (FRBH) in state court on various lender
liability claims, and FRBH counterclaimed for a deficiency remaining after
foreclosure on the collateral securing Pernie Bailey's note. FRBH was subsequently declared insolvent and the FDIC was appointed receiver. FDICReceiver then transferred certain of the assets and liabilities of FRBH to a
bridge bank, 46 which was later renamed NCNB Texas National Bank
(NCNB), and agreed to indemnify NCNB with respect to certain potential
liabilities associated with the transferred assets. FDIC-Receiver and NCNB
removed the case to federal court, and the district court remanded the case
to state court. The district court remanded on the basis that NCNB was the
real party in interest to the exclusion of the FDIC and the claims involved
47
were state law causes of action.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision to remand the case to state court. 48 The appellate court found that
the FDIC was a proper party to the suit, in addition to NCNB, because of
the FDIC's obligation to indemnify NCNB with respect to the suit and because the FDIC, as receiver of a failed bank, is the proper party to defend
claims for damages against the failed bank. 49 As the FDIC was a proper
party to the lawsuit, the federal district court had jurisdiction50 and its remand of the case to state court was inappropriate. 5 '
2. Statutes of Limitation
The case of FDIC v. Howse5 2 involved claims by the FDIC as successor in
interest to Alliance Savings and Loan Association (Alliance), an insolvent
savings and loan, against the former directors and officers of Alliance. The
FDIC brought an action for damages sounding in tort and breach of contract for the officers' and directors' alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties.5 3 The defendants argued that the FDIC's claims were barred by the
54
Texas statutes of limitations.
45. 905 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(i)(2) (1988) (current version at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(n)(1) (1990))
provided the FDIC with the authority to establish a bridge bank in order to facilitate the

resolution of a failed bank.
47. 905 F.2d at 79.
48. Id. at 80.
49. Id.

50. See supra note 6.
51. 905 F.2d at 80.
52. 736 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
53. Id. at 1439, 1441.
54. Id. at 1439. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.003, 16.004 (Vernon
1986) (statutes of limitations for certain tort actions and contract actions, respectively).
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The first question addressed by the Howse court was whether the running
of the time periods provided by the statutes of limitations was tolled while
the directors accused of wrongdoing controlled Alliance's board. Although
the FDIC admitted that it had contemporaneous knowledge of defendants'
alleged injurious acts, the court held that the accrual of the FDIC's causes of
action was tolled.55 The court adopted the "adverse domination rule,"
which provides that a corporation's cause of action against its directors does
not accrue as long as the culpable directors make up a majority of the
board.5 6 The court rejected defendants' argument that in place of the adverse domination rule the court should require the FDIC to demonstrate
full, complete and exclusive control over Alliance by the defendants before
finding that the accrual of the FDIC's causes of action were tolled. 57 The
court reasoned that the adverse domination rule is in accord with Texas law,
that the rule urged by defendants was accepted only in the Second and Ninth
Circuits, and that the adverse domination rule more accurately reflects the
reality of suing wrongdoing directors who control a corporation. 58
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that, although they remained as directors for a time afterward, they did not control Alliance once
Alliance came under supervisory control and entered into consent agreements with federal and state thrift regulators. 59 The court stated that the
defendants continued to control Alliance following these events, that the adverse domination rule tolled the accrual of the receiver's causes of action as
long as the defendants constituted the majority of the board regardless of the
consent agreements, and that the FDIC was powerless to pursue legal action
against the defendants despite the agreements. 60 Thus, the court held that
the FDIC's causes of action did not accrue until the defendants resigned as
Alliance's directors, and, as a result, the limitations periods1 for the FDIC's
6
claims had not expired before the receiver's appointment.
Upon the appointment of a receiver for Alliance, the federal statute of
limitations preempted the Texas statutes of limitations and became applicable to the FDIC's claims. 62 The general federal statute of limitations, set
forth in 28 U.S.C. section 2415,63 provides for limitations periods that begin
running from the time a cause of action accrues. 64 However, 12 U.S.C. sec55. 736 F. Supp. at 1441.
56. Id. at 144142. The court cited Allen v. Wilkerson, 396 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) as Texas authority for the adverse domination rule. Id.
at 1441.
57. Id. at 1441-42.
58. Id.

59. Id. at 1442.
60. Id.

61. Id. at 1443-44.
62. Id. As long as the state limitations period does not bar a claim, the federal statute of
limitations will apply when the FDIC is appointed receiver. See id. at 1440.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 provides for a six-year limitations period from the time a contract
cause of action accrues to an agency of the United States and a three-year limitations period
from the time a tort cause of action accrues to an agency of the United States. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2415(a), (b) (1988).
64. See supra note 63.
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tion 1821(d)(14), as amended by FIRREA, 65 provides that the federal statute of limitations for a cause of action brought by FDIC-Receiver begins to
run on the later of (i) the date of FDIC-Receiver's appointment as receiver
or (ii) the date the cause of action accrues. 66 The Howse defendants argued
that the more liberal time periods of section 1821(d)(14) were inapplicable
because (i) the FDIC was suing in its corporate capacity and not as receiver,
and (ii) the more liberal time periods made effective by the FIRREA amendment only applied prospectively and not to the subject lawsuit. 67 The court
rejected the first argument by noting that 12 U.S.C. section 1823, as
amended by FIRREA section 217,68 grants the FDIC in its corporate capacity (FDIC-Corporate) all of the rights that the FDIC has as receiver under,
among other provisions, 12 U.S.C. section 1821.69 The court rejected the
second argument by reasoning that statutory changes that relate only to procedure or remedy, as opposed to substantive rights, are usually held to be
immediately applicable to pending cases. 70
3.

Mandatory Stay of Action

The decision in Prince George Joint Venture v. Sunbelt Savings, F.S.B.71
involved a challenge to a stay of proceedings previously granted by the district court to the RTC, 72 which was a party to the proceedings by virtue of
65. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) provides:
(A) In General
Notwithstanding any provision of any contract, the applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action brought by the Corporation as conservator or
receiver shall be(i) in the case of any contract claim, the longer of(I) the 6-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or
(II) the period applicable under State law; and
(ii) in the case of any tort claim, the longer of(I) the 3-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or
(II) the period applicable under State law.
(B) Determination of the Date on Which a Claim Accrues
For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which the statute of limitation begins to run on any claim described in such subparagraph shall be
the later of(i) the date of the appointment of the Corporation as conservator or receiver; or
(ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(14) (1989).
66. Id.
67. 736 F. Supp. at 1445.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d)(3)(A) provides: "With respect to any asset acquired or liability
assumed pursuant to this section, the Corporation shall have all of the rights, powers, privileges, and authorities of the Corporation as receiver under sections 1821 and 1825(b) of this
title." 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(d)(3)(A) (1989).
69. 736 F. Supp. at 1445.
70. Id. at 1446.
71. 744 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12) provides:
(12) SUSPENSION OF LEGAL ACTIONS
(A) In general
After the appointment of a conservator or receiver for an insured
depository institution, the conservator or receiver may request a
stay for a period not to exceed -
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its being appointed conservator and then receiver of one of the defendants.'3
The Prince George court found the granting of a stay upon the RTC's request following its appointment as receiver to be mandatory. 74 The court
noted that other courts had reached a different conclusion by considering
such factors as the harm that would result to the other parties to an action
from the granting of a stay7" and the amount of time that had passed following the receiver's appointment before a stay was requested. 7 6 The Prince
George court rejected these holdings by stating that each imposed requirements not found in 12 U.S.C. section 1821(d)(12) and that a plain reading of
the statute revealed an absence of Congressional intent to impose any such
requirements on the granting of a stay. 77 The Prince George court therefore
8
denied the motion before it for reconsideration of the granting of the stay.'
The Prince George case raises the question of whether the northern and
southern districts of Texas will continue to disagree regarding the granting
of a receiver's request for a stay. The northern district in the Prince George
decision declined to follow the holding of the southern district in FDIC v.
Taylor,79 which held that a receivers request for a stay is subject to a time
requirement. A decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit may
be necessary to resolve the difference between the district courts on this
issue.
4. Mootness
Village South Joint Venture v. FDIC8 0 addressed a common procedural
question arising in lawsuits against insolvent financial institutions. The
plaintiff had filed a lawsuit against Vista Savings Association (Vista), a savings and loan that was subsequently declared insolvent by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), and for which the FSLIC was appointed receiver. The FDIC became the successor to the FSLIC as receiver following
the passage of FIRREA. At the time of the insolvency, the FHLBB determined that under the Texas depositor preference statute81 Vista's assets were
(i) 45 days, in the case of any conservator, and
(ii) 90 days, in the case of any receiver,
in any judicial action or proceeding to which such institution is or
becomes a party.
(B) Grant of stay by all courts required
Upon receipt of a request by any conservator or receiver pursuant to
subparagraph (A) for a stay of any judicial action or proceeding in
any court with jurisdiction of such action or proceeding, the court
shall grant such stay as to all parties.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(12) (1989).
73. 744 F. Supp. at 134.
74. Id. at 135.
75. See Tuxedo Beach Club Corp. v. City Fed. Say. Bank, 729 F. Supp. 1508, 1509-10,
superseded on other grounds, 737 F. Supp. 18 (D.N.J. 1990).
76. See FDIC v. Taylor, 727 F. Supp. 326, 327-28 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
77. 744 F. Supp. at 135.
78. Id. at 136.
79. See 727 F. Supp. 326, 327-28 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
80. 733 F. Supp. 50, 51-52 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
81. The Texas depositor preference statute provides a classification scheme for the pay-

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

insufficient to allow any recovery to Vista's unsecured creditors if Vista were
liquidated. The FDIC argued that its maximum liability to the plaintiff in
this case was zero, citing 12 U.S.C. section 1821,82 which limits the FDIC's
liability in a case of this type to the amount the claimant would have received had the insolvent institution in question been liquidated, and the
FHLBB's determination that unsecured creditors would have received nothing if Vista had been liquidated. The court agreed with the FDIC's reasoning, stating that the FHLBB's determination of the value of Vista's assets
and liabilities was conclusive and that a court was neither permitted to disregard such a determination nor empowered to examine it in this type of pro84
ceeding.8 3 The court granted the FDIC its motion for summary judgment.
Cox v. Sunbelt Savings Association of Texas8 5 contrasts with Village South
Joint Venture in the degree of deference the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit was willing to grant a regulatory agency's determination of the value
of an insolvent thrift's assets and liabilities. Cox involved lender liability
claims filed against Sunbelt Savings Association of Texas (Sunbelt), which
was subsequently declared insolvent. Upon Sunbelt's failure, the FHLBB
determined that Sunbelt's assets were insufficient to allow any recovery by
Sunbelt's unsecured creditors.86 After overturning the original basis of the
district court's dismissal of this lawsuit,8 7 the Cox court refused to affirm the
lower court's dismissal on the alternative basis of mootness.88 The court
observed, citing its holding in Triland Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Service
Corp.,89 that the assertion that a savings and loan in receivership lacks assets
to satisfy a judgment does not render a claim against the insolvent institution
moot as long as it is possible that the claimants might be able to collect on a
judgment at some point.90 The court then noted that no evidence had been
offered to the district court that Sunbelt would never have sufficient assets to
satisfy a judgment, which evidence would justify a finding of mootness. 9 1
ment of claims against deposits of a failed financial institution and requires that all valid claims

in a class be paid in full before consideration of claims in the next class. The claims of secured

creditors and depositors rank ahead of the claims of general creditors. See TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 8.09(g) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
82. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(i)(2) provides:
Maximum Liability
The maximum liability of the Corporation (FDIC], acting as receiver or in any
other capacity, to any person having a claim against the receiver or the insured
depository institution for which such receiver is appointed shall equal the
amount such claimant would have received if the Corporation had liquidated
the assets and liabilities of such institution without exercising the Corporation's
authority under subsection (n) of this section or section 1823 of this title.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(i)(2) (1989).
83. 733 F. Supp. at 51-52.
84. Id. at 52.
85. 896 F.2d 957, 958-60 (5th Cir. 1990).

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
89 6 F.2d at 958-9.
Id. at 960.
884 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1989).
896 F.2d at 959.
Id. at 959-60.
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The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. 92
The Cox holding raises a question about the evidence required to obtain
dismissal of lawsuits against insolvent financial institutions on the grounds
that the receivership estate possesses insufficient assets to satisfy a judgment.
The FHLBB's determination concerning the value of Sunbelt's assets and
liabilities at the time of insolvency was presumably on the record submitted
to the Cox court and yet the court stated that the record was insufficient to
93
determine whether assets would eventually be available to pay a claim.
The Cox holding contrasts with the holding in Village South Joint Venture,
which was based solely on the value of the institution's assets and liabilities
at the time of insolvency. 94 The difference between these two cases may be
explained by the fact that Village South Joint Venture involved a statute specifically addressing the receiver's liability in this situation while Cox involved the general concept of prudential mootness. 95 The statute analyzed
in Village South Joint Venture fixed the relevant time for valuing the assets
and liabilities of the insolvent institution - at failure, while the Cox mootness analysis inquired whether the receivership would ever have sufficient
assets to satisfy a judgment. 96 Presumably, the FDIC now will receive
greater deference under section 1821 than was the case under the prudential
mootness test.
B. Substantive Superpowers
1. D'Oench Duhme and 12 U.S. C. Section 1823(e)
Initially, the D'Oench Duhme doctrine precluded a customer of a failed
bank, who "lent himself to a scheme or arrangement"97 designed to mislead
the regulatory authorities supervising that bank, from raising certain common law defenses against FDIC-Receiver. 98 In 1950, Congress adopted 12
U.S.C. section 1823(e), which provided that "[n]o agreement which tends to
diminish or defeat the right, title or interest of the Corporation [the FDIC]
in any asset acquired by it... shall be valid against the Corporation, unless"
92. Id. at 960.
93. Id. at 959-60
94. 733 F. Supp. at 52.
95. 896 F.2d at 959-60.
96. 733 F. Supp. at 51-52; 896 F.2d at 959-60. But see Gulley v. Sunbelt Savings, F.S.B.,
902 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1991) (No. 90-537)
in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit seems to contradict its holding in Cox. In
Gulley, the court held that the FHLBB's determination that the receivership estate of an insolvent thrift lacked the assets to satisfy a judgment was binding upon the court and supported
the dismissal of the suit. Id. at 351 n.4. It is not clear whether the Gulley court's holding was
based upon procedural considerations in the case (the plaintiffs had failed to challenge the
FHLBB's determination in the district court that the receivership estate was insufficient to
satisfy plaintiffs' claims and the case was collateral to a second case in which the plaintiffs
sought to establish their claims) or was meant generally to prevent suits seeking recovery after
a determination of a receivership's inability to satisfy judgments.
97. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460 (1942) (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 460-61.
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certain conditions are satisfied.9 9 Significantly, the courts have held that the
statute codified'O but did not supplant the D'Oench Duhme doctrine."°"
Thus, parties who could not raise section 1823(e) as a defense, because sec-

tion 1823(e) was only available to the FDIC in its corporate capacity
(FDIC-Corporate), as distinguished from its capacity as receiver,' 0 2 were
still able to rely on D'Oench Duhme.
In recent years, the courts have reasoned that certain parties are similarly
situated with FDIC-Corporate and, accordingly, should be provided with
the protection of section 1823(e).10 3 Hence, there has been a judicial trend
to interpret section 1823(e) and D'Oench Duhme in pari materia, thereby
broadening the availability of section 1823(e) to parties who were entitled to
employ D'Oench Duhme. This trend was recognized by Congress when it
adopted FIRREA. FIRREA explicitly extended the protections afforded by
°4
section 1823(e) to cover the FDIC-Receiver and the RTC.'

99. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 797, Ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873, 889
(1950) (emphasis added).
The original act has been amended and currently reads:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the Corporation [FDIC-Corporate] in any asset acquired by it under this section or section
1821 of this title, either as security for a loan or by purchase or as receiver of any
insured depository institution, shall be valid against the Corporation unless such

agreement

-

(1) is in writing,
(2) was executed by the depository institution and any person claiming an
adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the
acquisition of the asset by the depository institution,
(3) was approved by the board of directors of the depository institution or its
loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board
or committee, and
(4) has been continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of
the depository institution.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(e) (1989).
100. See FSLIC v. Hsi, 657 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (E.D. La. 1986).
101. FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 514 n.l (5th Cir. 1986) (enactment of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e) did not preempt D'Oench Duhme when FDIC acts in its capacity as receiver.)
102. Although, prior to FIRREA, § 1823(e) only applied to the FDIC-Corporate, Beighley
v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 783-84 (5th Cir. 1989), courts have extended the protection afforded
by § 1823(e) to the FDIC-Receiver and the FSLIC by interpreting D'Oench Duhme to apply in
the same manner as § 1823(e). See Id. at 782-83 (D'Oench Duhme, "which is the common law
counterpart to § 1823(e)," barred Beighley's fraud claims against FDIC-Receiver because such
claims were based on promises that were not reflected in the Board or committee minutes and
were not contained in a contemporaneous document); FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1254
(5th Cir. 1988) ("While neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has extended these protections [D'Oench Duhme and § 1823(e)] to FSLIC, we see no reason to treat these regulatory
authorities [FDIC and FSLIC] differently.")
The D'Oench Duhme doctrine and § 1823(e) have continued to merge in recent years. See
Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1526 n.4 (5th Cir. 1990) ("There are two D'Oench,
Duhme doctrines, one statutory (12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)) and one of common law."). See also
infra notes 139-173 and accompanying text (discussion and analysis of Kilpatrick v. Riddle).
103. FDIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d at 1254 (extending protection of § 1823(e) to FSLIC). See
supra note 102.
104. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 217(e), 501(b)(4), 103 Stat. 183, 256-57, 370 (1989) (codified as 12
U.S.C. §§ 1823(e), 1441a(b)(4)). Presumably, § 1823(e) should be available to conservators
because, under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the term "receiver" includes the term "conservator." 12 U.S.C. § 18130) (1988).
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a. Availability of D'Oench Duhme and Section 1823(e) on a Post-Judgment Basis. The superpowers of the FDIC and the RTC, as enhanced by
FIRREA, will often change the result in cases in which judgments are entered against financial institutions. Consequently, the courts have wrestled
with the issue of whether the protections provided by D'Oench Duhme and
section 1823(e) should be available in cases in which a decision was rendered
prior to the appointment of a receiver.10 5 In other words, can either the
RTC or FDIC-Receiver raise section 1823(e) and D'Oench Duhme for the
first time on appeal? The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Olney
Savings & Loan Association v. Trinity Banc Savings Association1 O6 held that
FIRREA did not empower the former FSLIC10 7 to raise D'Oench Duhme
for the first time on appeal.10 8 The Dallas Court of Appeals, however, in
two cases 0 9 decided during the survey period, explicitly disagreed with the
Fifth Circuit.1 10
In FSLIC v. T.F. Stone - Liberty Land Associates, ' Tommy Stone and
certain entities he controlled (collectively Stone) brought suit against Sunbelt
Savings Association of Texas (Sunbelt) and its service corporation subsidiary-Sunbelt Service Corporation-asserting, among other things, breach of
contract and fraudulent inducement. After the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Stone, Sunbelt was declared insolvent.1 12 The FSLIC was
appointed as receiver for Sunbelt (FSLIC-Receiver) and moved to vacate the
decision of the trial court based on a number of alleged errors, the most
significant of which concerned the application of D'Oench Duhme and sec113
tion 1823(e).
The Stone court first addressed whether the judgment involved any "assets" in which FSLIC-Receiver's interests could be diminished making section 1823(e) available.' 14 The court concluded that assets of Sunbelt and its
subsidiary, which were the subject of an adverse judgment, still remain as
105. Another question confronting the courts is whether the new powers contained in FIRREA may be applied retroactively to circumstances existing prior to the enactment of the
statute. See Dennis, Lender Liability Claims Against Insolvent Banks, 2 LENDER LIABILITY
NEWS, Nov. 29, 1989, at 9, 12. ("Significant questions exist... as to whether FIRREA even
applies to receiverships that began prior to its date of enactment [Aug. 9, 1989]."). The cases
that addressed the question of the availability of the superpowers for the first time on appeal
also addressed the retroactivity issue. See infra text accompanying notes 132-34.
106. 885 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1989).
107. FIRREA dissolved the FSLIC. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 401(a)(1), 103 Stat. 183, 354
(1989) (abolishing FSLIC and repealing 12 U.S.C. § 1725 (1988)).

108. 885 F.2d at 275.
109. The first case, FSLIC v. T.F. Stone-Liberty Land Associates, 787 S.W.2d 475 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, writ granted), is discussed infra in the text accompanying footnotes 111135. The second case, FDIC/Manager Fund v. Larson, 793 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. App. - Dallas
1990, writ granted), which was decided by the same court that rendered the Stone decision and
follows the analysis applied in Stone, is not discussed herein.
110. 787 S.W.2d at 483; 793 S.W.2d at 41-42.
111. 787 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ granted).

112. Id. at 477-78.
113. Id. at 477.
114. See 787 S.W.2d at 482. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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assets of the receivership estate until all appeals are exhausted.' 1 5 Thus, the
protections provided by D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) were available
to FSLIC-Receiver."1 6 In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Olney held that funds used to post a supersedeas bond were no longer
assets of the insolvent institution." 7 In addition, the Olney court determined that the decision of the trial court voided the loan participations at
issue in Olney, the effect of which removed such assets from the receivership
estate."" Thus, the Olney court concluded that FSLIC-Receiver's interests
could not be defeated or diminished because the receiver never acquired any
assets related to the litigation." 9
After concluding that FSLIC-Receiver did succeed to the assets that were
the subject of the litigation, the Stone court next considered whether FSLICReceiver could raise D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) for the first time
on appeal. The Stone court noted that Congress amended 12 U.S.C. section
1821 to provide that the FDIC as conservator or receiver retains all the
rights and remedies that the insured depository institution enjoyed before
the FDIC was appointed as conservator or receiver "in the event of any
appealablejudgment." 120 The Stone court reasoned that section 1821 provides FSLIC-Receiver, on appeal, with all of the rights and remedies available to FSLIC-Corporate, one of which is the right to avoid side agreements.
Thus, section 1823(e) could be raised by FSLIC-Receiver for the first time
on appeal.' 2' In contrast, the Olney court had stated that the purpose of the
amendments to section 1821 was to provide FSLIC-Receiver with standing
to pursue appeals because prior to FIRREA only FSLIC-Corporate had
standing to pursue certain actions.' 22
The Stone court acknowledged its disagreement with the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, but was convinced of the veracity of its own opinion for
two reasons. First, it read the language of 12 U.S.C. section 1821(d)(13)(B)
to concern rights and remedies - not standing.123 Second, the Stone court
reasoned that 12 U.S.C. section 1821(d)(13)(A), 124 which requires FSLIC115.

787 S.W.2d at 482.

The Stone court relied, in part, on interpretations of the term "final judgment" in 12 U.S.C.
§ 91 ("no attachment, injunction, or execution, shall be issued against such [national banking]
association or its property before finaljudgment in any suit, action or proceeding, in any State,
county, or municipal court." 12 U.S.C. § 91 (1988) (emphasis added)), as requiring exhaustion of all appeals before an institution's assets may be attached. 787 S.W.2d at 482.
116. 787 S.W.2d at 482.
117. 885 F.2d at 274.
118. Id.at 275.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 483 (quoting from FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 212, 103 Stat. 183, 232
(1989) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(B)) (court's emphasis).
121. 787 S.W.2d at 483.
122. 885 F.2d at 275.
123. 787 S.W.2d at 484. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(I3)(B) (1989).
124. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(A) provides that "[t]he Corporation [the FDIC] shall abide
by any final unappealable judgment of any court of competent jurisdiction which was rendered
before the appointment of the Corporation as conservator or receiver." 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1821(d)(13)(A) (1989).

1991]

BANKING LAW

Receiver to abide by unappealable judgments, supported its decision. 12 5 The
Stone court stated that Congress distinguished between appealable and unappealable judgments in sections 1821(d)(13)(A) and (B) to clarify that the
receiver could raise certain rights, such as section 1823(e), for the first time
126
on appeal.
In reaching its conclusions, the Stone court also dismissed the decision of
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Grubb v. FDIC,127 which held
that a judgment issued against a bank prior to the institution's closure eliminates an asset from the receivership estate. 128 The Stone court reasoned that
a judgment might be reversed on appeal, thereby restoring the asset to the
receivership.1 29 Accordingly, until an unappealable decision has been entered, a latent asset with potential value still exists in the receivership estate.
The Stone court also dismissed the holding of its sister court of appeals in
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Kennedy 130 because the Kennedy
13 1
court reached its decision prior to the adoption of FIRREA.
Stone argued that even if the amendments to 12 U.S.C. section 1821 extended the protection afforded by section 1823(e) to FSLIC-Receiver, such
32
rights should not be applied "retroactively" in light of legislative history.1
The Stone court stated that there was no reason to rely on legislative history
because the statute is unambiguous.' 33 Moreover, the broad statements of
one representative, which supported Stone's argument, were not entitled to
much weight because they were inserted or appended to the record. The
Stone court acknowledged that laws are generally presumed to have only
prospective application. Nonetheless, the court de6ided to permit section
1821 to operate retroactively because the statute only clarified the proce134
dures pursuant to which pre-existing rights would be enforced.
The decision in Stone provides the FDIC and the RTC whenever they are
appointed receiver, post-judgment but before all appeals have run, with a
Hobson's choice. Presumably, their first choice would be to seek to remove
125. 787 S.W.2d at 484-85.
126. Id. at 484.
127. 868 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1989).
128. Id. at 1158.
129. 787 S.W.2d at 483-84.
130. See 732 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. 787 S.W.2d at 482.
132. Id. at 486. Stone quoted Representative Ortiz, who stated that "[t]he powers [of the
FDIC] set forth in this bill [FIRREA] are, in many respects, new, and there is no intent that
such powers be applied to receiverships that have been established prior to enactment of this
bill," for the proposition that the legislative history rejected retroactive application of the expanded receivership powers. Id. (quoting 135 CONG. REC. H5003 (daily ed. August 3, 1989)
(statement of Rep. Ortiz)).
133. It seems surprising that the Stone court would find its reading of 12 U.S.C. § 1821 to
be unambiguous when three other courts reached an opposite interpretation to that of the
Stone court. See supra notes 106-08, 116-18, 126-30 and accompanying text.
134. Id. at 487-88. In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Griffon v.
United States Department of Health & Human Services, employed a more exacting standard
for retroactive application of subsequent statutory enactments. 802 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1986).
The Griffon court held that legislation applies "prospectively absent unequivocal Congressional intent." Id. at 155.
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to federal court a case originally filed in state court because the federal
courts are thought to be more knowledgeable concerning federal claims and
defenses, such as D'Oench Duhme. Under Olney, however, the federal court
would leave intact the state court decision. Accordingly, the FDIC or RTC
are better off leaving the case in the state system, even if the state courts are
less knowledgeable, and having the lower state court decision vacated.
b. Availability of D'Oench Duhme and Section 1823(e) Outside the
Lender-BorrowerRelationship. In recent years, the parties who are entitled
to rely on section 1823(e) and the boundaries of the term "agreement" have
been expanded, both statutorily1 3s by Congress and judicially, most notably
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Langley v. FDIC.136 Similarly, the jurisprudence concerning the circumstances encompassed within the terms "scheme
or arrangement,"' 137 and thus, the situations in which the D'Oench Duhme
doctrine is applicable, have been marked by a continuous, albeit unsteady,
expansion.1 38 Several cases decided during the survey period addressed the
scope of such terms.
(i) Securities Claims. In Kilpatrick v. Riddle,139 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that D'Oench Duhme barred a suit alleging securities' law violations. 140 The plaintiffs were borrowers from one of the former
First RepublicBanks (FRB) who used loan proceeds to purchase stock in
Texas National Bank (TNB). The loans allegedly benefitted FRB by affording FRB with new collateral for the debts owed to it by two controlling
shareholders of TNB who were promoting this investment. TNB was to use
such funds to establish several new branches. The borrowers claimed that
FRB defrauded them by failing to disclose: (i) the existence of a voting
trust, pursuant to which the promoters maintained control over TNB, (ii)
that the TNB stock was overvalued, and (iii) that the proposed branches
4
were "doomed to fail from the outset."' '
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in dispatching all of the plaintiffs' arguments, held that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by D'Oench
Duhme and section 1823(e). 142 The Kilpatrick court stated that the plaintiffs' claims, although couched in terms of the federal securities laws, were,
135. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
136. 484 U.S. 86, 86-92 (1987) ("agreement" includes warranties made by bank regarding
land financed by bank).
137. See supra notes 97 and 98 and accompanying text.
138. Gray, Limitations on the FDIC'sD'Oench Doctrineof Federal Common-Law Estoppel:
CongressionalPreemption and Authoritative Statutory Construction, 31 S. TEX. LAW. REv.
245, 248 (1990) (Federal courts have applied D'Oench Duhme in an ever expanding manner);
see also Sontag, To Thrift Fraud Victims: Government Says 'Tough Luck', Nat'l Law. J., Sept.
24, 1990, at 3, col. 1, 40, col.4. ("[Ifn the past few years, the courts have given regulators more

and more power to collect [from borrowers of failed financial institution].").
139. 907 F.2d 1523 (5th Cir. 1990) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 954, 59
U. S. L. W. 3548 (1991).
140. Id. at 1524, 1526.
141. Id. at 1525.

142. Id. at 1526.

1991]

BANKING LAW

in reality, claims of fraudulent inducement. 143 The U.S. Supreme Court in'
Langley made it clear that the requirements of section 1823(e) are applicable
to agreements that parties are fraudulently induced to enter into as a consequence of the actions of a failed bank. 144 Accordingly, the claims of misrepresentation under the securities laws were tantamount to a side agreement,
which did not survive D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) challenge.1 45
The court considered its opinion to be only a minor extension of its earlier
rulings, pursuant to which it had previously barred breach of duty and fraud
claims arising under state law. 14 6 Thus, the Kilpatrick court held that
D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) were broad enough to bar federal securities law claims based on alleged side agreements.1 47
The plaintiffs also claimed that their cause of action should survive
D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) on policy grounds. The plaintiffs asserted that the policy of protecting investors underlying the securities law
should outweigh the competing policy of minimizing the cost to the insurance fund underlying the D'Oench Duhme doctrine. The Kilpatrick court
disagreed for two reasons. First, the decision did not strip the plaintiffs of
their securities law protections. The plaintiffs could still bring an action.
against the promoters directly.1 48 Second, no policy exists for the federal
government to compensate a person because his investments fail.149
The Kilpatrick court acknowledged that one of its sister courts in Gilman
v. FDIC150 had indicated that investors might be able to rescind transactions
143. Id. at 1528.
144. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 90-92 (1987); see supra note 136 and accompanying
text.
145. 907 F.2d at 1528.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1529.
148. Id.
149. Id. The Kilpatrick court is correct in recognizing that if the plaintiffs' securities law
claims succeeded against the FDIC-Receiver, then the cost to the insurance fund of resolving
FRB would have increased. The court's second statement, however, misconstrued the plaintiffs' contention. The plaintiffs were not asking the FDIC to compensate them "because [their]
investments fail[ed]," but instead, claimed that they would never have made such investments
but for the misrepresentations of the failed bank. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were seeking
to rescind the entire transaction.
150. 660 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1981); see also, Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 874 (11th
Cir. 1982) cert. den. 459 U.S. 826 (1982). The Gunter court stated that it was "less confident"
that the policies behind section 1823(e) would outweigh "the strong policies of investor protection embodied in securities law." Id. Conversely, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
later rejected fraud in the inducement claims based on the securities laws in FDIC v. Investors
Assocs. X., Ltd., 775 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1985) (Investors who signed blank promissory
notes were estopped from raising securities fraud as a defense to payment on such notes). See
also FDIC v. Rockelman, 460 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (Claims based on bank
officers' alleged misrepresentations to borrower concerning prospective dividend payments and
future appreciation of stock could not be brought against the FDIC).
Although the Kilpatrick court was correct that these decisions all predated FIRREA, the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Vernon v. RTC in dictum stated that D'Oench
Duhme does not preclude shareholders of an insolvent institution from bringing claims arising
under the federal securities laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). See Vernon v. RTC, 907 F.2d 1101, 1108 (11th Cir. 1990). The Vernon court stated:
The expansion of the D'Oench doctrine suggested by New Freedom [the assignee
of certain of the assets and liabilities of the former Freedom Savings and Loan
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entered into based on violations of the securities laws.' 5' The court, however, noted that the Gilman ruling and certain other decisions predated
Langley. On that basis, the court dismissed the precedential effect of such
decisions. 152
Judge Brown, dissenting, would not have extended the reach of D'Oench
Duhme and section 1823(e) to federal securities law claims. 5 3 According to
the dissent, fraud under the securities law will render an entire transaction
void, provided that the person acquiring the asset has actual knowledge of
the securities law violation.154 If the transaction is void, the FDIC never
acquired the plaintiffs' notes. 155
The dissent also stated several reasons to treat claims arising under the
federal securities laws differently from state and common law fraud claims.
First, a violation of the federal securities laws, unlike state common law
claims, renders the transaction void instead of voidable.' 5 6 Second, the need
for uniformity in resolving federal problems is preserved because the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 57 is a federal statute.' 58 Third, the
FDIC will not be subject to a rash of securities lawsuits because the FDIC
will only be liable if it actually participated in, or possessed actual knowledge of, the fraudulent transaction.' 59 The dissent stated that its reasoning
would craft only a limited exception to the bars of D'Oench Duhme and
section 1823(e), for in most cases, the FDIC will not possess knowledge of
the impropriety.' 60
The dissent also distinguished a misrepresentation from an omission.1 6'
The dissent agreed that FRB's unrecorded representations were barred by
D'Oench Duhme,' 62 but stated that FRB violated the securities laws when it
did not disclose what it knew regarding TNB's deteriorating financial condition.' 6 3 If FDIC-Receiver knew of such a violation, the dissent would not
Association] might well further the background goal of favoring and facilitating
the purchase and assumption of insolvent banks over liquidation. We decline to
adopt such a rule, however, as we believe it would be both inappropriate and
unnecessary in this appeal...
... The rule proposed by New Freedom would bar such claims [tort claims]
from being successfully asserted when Congress has provided that such claims

be paid. New Freedom's rule cannot prevail. (emphasis added).
Id.
151. 907 F.2d at 528. See 660 F.2d at 693-94.
152. Id.

153. Id. at 1530.
154. According to the dissent, fraud under the federal securities laws renders the entire

transaction void, provided the person acquiring the asset has actual knowledge of the securities
law violation. Id. at 1530 n.5 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1988)).
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 1531.
Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
907 F.2d at 1531.

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1532.
162. Id. at 1533.
163. Id. at 1532.
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have applied D'Oench Duhme to protect FDIC-Receiver from liability under
the securities laws for FRB's omissions.
The dissent's distinction between omissions and misrepresentations would
be difficult to apply. Often a statement made by an issuer of securities is a
misrepresentation because the issuer fails to disclose certain other information. Thus, the same statement may be both a misrepresentation and an
omission. Moreover, as was the case in Kilpatrick, misrepresentations are
often made in conjunction with omissions. It may be impossible to determine whether it was the misrepresentations, the omissions, or a combination
of both, that convinced the investor to purchase the securities.
The dissent stated that its reasoning would craft only a limited exception
to D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) because the receiver typically does
not have actual knowledge of the failed bank's improper conduct.' 64 If the
dissent is correct regarding the receiver's knowledge of the failed institution's allegedly, wrongful behavior, then, presumably, permitting misrepresentations of which the receiver possesses actual knowledge, as well as all
omissions, to survive D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) would not signifi165
cantly expand such an exception.
The plaintiffs in Kilpatrick attempted to have the decision of the Court of
Appeals overturned. Plaintiffs, in their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Petition) 166 to the Supreme Court, asserted that the majority essentially twice
recast plaintiffs' contentions-first, by recasting plaintiffs' securities fraud
claim as an "agreement," and second, by recasting plaintiffs' claim of a
fraudulent issuance of securities under federal law as fraudulent inducement
to enter into an agreement under common law. 167 The plaintiffs further
averred that the majority's interpretation "stretches the meaning of the term
'agreement' beyond all reasonable limits." 168
According to the petitioners, the dissent correctly pointed out that the
majority failed to recognize that fraud under the federal securities laws renders the transaction void. 169 The petitioners, like the dissent, also asserted
that their analysis was supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Langley because under Langley, neither D'Oench Duhme nor section 1823(e) precludes a party from raising a claim or defense that would render a
transaction void. Applying the federal securities laws also does not require
70
the transaction to be recast.1
164. Id. at 1533.
165. The receiver must possess actual knowledge. The receiver will not be deemed to possess knowledge of the misrepresentations or omissions from its examinations of the institution,
or the existence of the litigation when the receiver is appointed. See infra text accompanying
note 236.
166. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rogers v. FDIC, 59 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. Oct. 24,
1990) (No. 90-692), reprinted in Failed Bank & Thrift Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications)
12563 (Dec. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Petition]. Page references refer to the page numbers of the
original petition as reprinted in the reporting service.
167. Petition, supra note 166, at 9-10.
168. Id. at 10 (citing 907 F.2d at 1532 (Brown, J., dissenting)).
169. Petition, supra note 166, at 11 (quoting 907 F.2d at 1531 (Brown, J., dissenting)).
170. Petition, supra note 166, at 11 (citing 907 F.2d at 1531-32 (Brown, J.dissenting)).
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The petitioners also claimed that the Kilpatrick decision impermissibly elevates federal common law over federal statutory law.17 1 The federal securities laws provide a comprehensive system for redress of injury resulting from
securities fraud. When a federal statute conflicts with federal common law,
the judicial crafted provision must give way.172 Accordingly, the federal securities laws must take precedence over D'Oench Duhme. The petitioners
also contended that even if section 1823(e) were applicable, the federal securities laws, which specifically address securities fraud, would override section
1823(e) when such statutory provisions conflict.' 73 Despite the petitioners'
contentions, the Supreme Court refused to grant their Petition.
(ii) Discharge of Indebtedness. In In re Smith, 174 the bankruptcy
court considered whether to deny discharge of indebtedness owed by James
Smith and Vernon Smith (the Smiths) and entities they individually or collectively controlled to FDIC-Receiver for Vernon Savings and Loan Association, F.S.A. (Vernon).175 FDIC-Receiver alleged that the Smiths conspired
with certain former officials of Vernon to defraud the insurance fund, and
that such fraud should bar discharge of the Smiths' indebtedness. The Smith
court, relying in part on D'Oench Duhme,176 agreed. The basis for this decision, even though limited to situations in which actual deceit exists, may
have significant consequences in light of the extent of fraud practiced on
thrift institutions in recent years. 177
In December 1984, a Vernon subsidiary, Dondi Residential Property, Inc.
(DRPI), sought to sell certain property, including a tract on Cedar Springs
Avenue in Dallas, Texas. This property possessed an appraised fair value of
less than DRPI's recorded investment. As an accommodation to Vernon,'17
the Smiths, through a limited partnership they created (Smith Springs Ltd.),
agreed to purchase the Cedar Springs tract at a price equal to the "book
value" of such property.
The purchase price was 100% financed by three notes: a $4,340,000 first
lien note, which was sold to San Jacinto Savings Association; a $1,085,000
second lien note; and a $170,000 unsecured note. The unsecured note was
171. Id. at 12. FDIC-Receiver, in Kilpatrick, relied on D'Oench Duhme and not on 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e) because Kilpatrick arose prior to FIRREA's extension of § 1823(e) to
receivers.
172. Petition supra note 166, at 12-13.
173. Id. at 15.
174. In re Smith, (FDIC v. Smith), 113 B.R. 297 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
175. 113 B.R. at 297-311. Title 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) prohibits discharge of indebtedness
when the debtor has caused "willful and malicious injury to another entity or to the property
of another entity." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988).
176. See infra text accompanying notes 180-190.
177. Ruling on S&L Fraudulent Loans Is Set, Wall St. J., April 17, 1990, at B-8, col.l
("The [Smith] ruling could have significant ramifications in Texas because so many fraudulent
loans were obtained from Texas thrifts.").
178. Vernon's loan policy provided that customers who engaged in transactions with DRPI
would be eligible for subsequent extensions of credit, provided the future loan was consistent
with the standards of Vernon's underwriter.
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used to conceal from the examiners that the sales price, and thus the loan
amount, exceeded the property's appraised fair value.
In exchange for the Smith's purchase of the Cedar Springs tract from
DRPI, Vernon later agreed to refinance a project at the corner of Celestial
and Montfort Avenues in Dallas, Texas, and fund the purchase of property
on New York Avenue in Arlington, Texas. James Smith applied to Vernon
for a loan under the name Conworth Properties, Inc. (Conworth), a corporation formed by Smith and of which he was the sole shareholder. Conworth
executed the Celestial/Montfort and New York Avenue loans. A portion of
the loan proceeds was to be used to cover various expenses of James Smith's
other companies and interests, which expenses included his salary.
Although Vernon's management was aware of this use of loan proceeds, the
loan documents did not disclose such use, nor was Vernon's underwriter
aware of it.
At the time the Celestial/Montfort and New York Avenue loans were
made, the Smiths' companies were experiencing significant cash flow
problems, which problems were known to Vernon's management officials.
Nonetheless, Vernon's underwriter determined that the proposed
$15,700,000 loan to purchase the New York Avenue property would be acceptable because such property had an appraised fair value of $17,500,000.
Conversely, the underwriter determined that the Celestial/Montfort refinancing was imprudent. Although the property had been appraised at
$8,900,000, the underwriter believed that the true fair value of the property
was lower than the $8,010,000 proposed loan amount. Nonetheless, Vernon
funded both the Celestial/Montfort refinancing and the New York Avenue
loan.
The FDIC sought to deny discharge of the Cedar Springs, Celestial/Montfort, and New York Avenue loans primarily under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(2)(A).' 79 According to the Smith court, section 523(a)(2)(A)
provides that a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code excludes indebtedness
if the debtor: (i) obtained the indebtedness pursuant to false representations,
(ii) made with the intent of deceiving the creditor, (iii) upon which the creditor reasonably relied, and (iv) as a result of which the creditor suffered a
loss.180 The Smith court evaluated all three loans under this test.
The Smith court denied discharge of the Cedar Springs loan.18 1 This loan
was structured in three notes, with the third note being unsecured and omitted from the closing documents. The purpose of the third note was to conceal from the examiners that Vernon was financing in excess of 100% of the
fair value of the property to enable DRPI to sell the property without experiencing a loss.18 2 The court noted that since Vernon conspired with the
179. 11 U.S.C. § 523 provides that a bankrupt debtor's discharge is to be denied for any
debt obtained by "false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)

(1988).

180. 113 B.R. at 304. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1988).
181. 113 B.R. at 306, 311.
182. Id. at 306.
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Smiths, it could not reasonably rely on the false documents; thus, it could
not have prevented a discharge. 18 3 The FDIC, however, was differently situated. Under D'Oench Duhme, the FDIC is assumed to have relied on the
contents of loan files, loan applications and closing files to its detriment.18 4
The Smith court also stated that the Smiths intended to and did harm the
insurance fund.18 5 Thus, under 11 U.S.C. section 523, the Smiths were not
entitled to a discharge of the indebtedness arising from the Cedar Springs
86
transaction.'
Similarly, the Smith court refused to discharge the Celestial/Montfort
debt. 187 Vernon's own underwriter concluded that the loan amount exceeded the value of the collateral securing the Celestial/Montfort debt.
Moreover, James Smith and Vernon's representatives knowingly concealed
from the examiners James Smith's use of a portion of the loan proceeds for
unrelated working capital needs. Again, the examiners were entitled to rely
on the veracity of the representations in the loan documents. Furthermore,
James Smith intended to and did injure Vernon's deposit insurer. Thus, the
test set forth in 11 U.S.C. section 523 was also met in the case of the Celes88
tial/Montfort debt.'
Conversely, the Smith court permitted the New York Avenue loan to be
discharged. 8 9 The Smith court found that, at the time of the loan, the fair
value of the collateral exceeded the loan amount.190 In addition, Vernon
retained the right to refuse any draws on the loan. Moreover, Smith was
entitled to use the loan proceeds to pay the obligations of his companies and
his own salary because the purpose statement for this loan was too vague to
limit the use of the loan proceeds.' 9 ' The Smith court noted that the draw
requests on the loan misrepresented the manner in which such funds were to
be used.' 92 Nonetheless, the court deemed such misrepresentations immaterial because they did not cause the indebtedness. 93 Thus, FDIC-Receiver
did not meet its burden of proof under 11 U.S.C. section 523.194
The Smith court could have reached a different conclusion by stressing
certain other facts. First, as the Smith court acknowledged, Vernon agreed
to fund the New York Avenue loan and to refinance the Celestial/Montfort
loans in exchange for Smith Springs Ltd.'s agreeing to purchase the Cedar
Springs tract. Second, when Vernon financed the New York Avenue loan,
the Smiths were experiencing severe cash flow problems. Third, the ap183. Id.
184. Id.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.

306, 311.
308, 311.
310, 311.
308.
308-09, 310.
309.

194. Id. at 309-10. The Smith court stated that refusal of discharge is disfavored. See id. at

305.
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praisal for the New York Avenue loan dramatically overvalued the collateral. The court noted that the appraisals on both the Cedar Springs tract
and the Celestial/Montfort projects were significantly inflated. The court
recognized that the appraisal on the collateral 9ecuring the New York Avenue loan was also inflated because the court even assumed a discount of the
appraised value of the New York Avenue property. Thus, Vernon made a
loan to a party in a deteriorating position, without cash flow to service the
loan and secured by collateral with an overinflated value.
Surprisingly, however, the Smith court evaluated each of these loans in
isolation. The Smith court noted that the Smiths assisted Vernon in concealing information from the examiners in connection with both the Cedar
Springs and the Celestial/Montfort loans. Similarly, the draw requests on
the New York Avenue project misrepresented the use of the proceeds of the
draws. From the parties' course of dealing and the court's conclusions regarding the Cedar Springs tract and the Celestial/Montfort project, it would
seem appropriate for the court to have inferred that the New York Avenue
loan was part of an arrangement designed to defraud a financial institution.
(iii) Lease Arrangements. In FDIC v. Zoubi 195 the court barred a
breach of fiduciary duty claim that a lessor raised against his lessee's lender.
Originally, Zoubi leased a car wash to a lessee who obtained financing
through Texas American Bank/Richardson, N.A. (TAB-Richardson). After the lessee defaulted, Zoubi considered selling the car wash, but TABRichardson advised him against selling because of the lack of creditworthiness of the prospective purchaser. Instead, two weeks later, TAB-Richardson's president informed Zoubi that Michael and Janice Caylor (the Caylors)
desired to lease the car wash. Zoubi and the Caylors then entered into a
lease.
TAB-Richardson provided financing for the Caylors to improve the property. Zoubi and the Caylors entered into an Assignment of Lease with TABRichardson. Zoubi also subordinated his lien in the car wash equipment to
TAB-Richardson's lien. Lastly, Zoubi signed a letter pursuant to which he
agreed to notify TAB-Richardson if the Caylors defaulted under the lease.
In the letter Zoubi further agreed that the lease would remain in effect despite any default by the Caylors, provided TAB-Richardson honored the
terms of the lease.
Shortly thereafter, the Caylors defaulted on the lease. TAB-Richardson
sold the collateral and applied the proceeds against the Caylors' indebtedness. Zoubi contended that TAB-Richardson's officers had orally guaranteed the lease. Zoubi also contended that TAB-Richardson's actions to
recover on the collateral breached its fiduciary duty to him.
FDIC-Receiver raised section 1823(e) and D'Oench Duhme as defenses to
Zoubi's claims. Zoubi contended that such defenses were unavailable because he was not claiming an adverse interest in an asset acquired by a depository institution. Instead, Zoubi sought to enforce TAB-Richardson's
195. 792 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
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guarantee of the lease. Accordingly, Zoubi concluded that the transactions
in question did not involve an "agreement" for the purposes of section
1823(e). 196 Zoubi also asserted that he did not participate in any "scheme or
arrangement" designed to deceive the banking examiners. 197 Instead, TABRichardson's officers had represented to Zoubi that TAB-Richardson guaranteed the Caylors' obligations under the lease.
The Zoubi court broadly interpreted the term "agreement" to apply to
any claim of fraud or misrepresentation, regardless of whether such claim
arose in the debtor-creditor context. 198 The court then applied 'section
1823(e) and D'Oench Duhme to bar Zoubi's claims because such claims did
99
not meet the requirements of section 1823(e).1

The Zoubi decision continues the trend of expanding the scope of the term
"agreement.' 200 In a general sense, all claims, if successful, would have the
effect of diminishing the receivership assets or the depository institution's
assets. Consequently, the Zoubi court's expansive reading of the term
"agreement" to encompass any fraud or misrepresentation even if made to
noncustomers of the failed bank will result in few claims falling outside the
20
scope of section 1823(e). 1
(iv) Participations.The case of Royal Bank of Canada v. FDIC20 2
concerned another type of transaction outside the lender-borrower framework in which D'Oench Duhme applies. In 1981, RepublicBank Fort
Worth, N.A. (RepublicBank) entered into an interbank credit agreement
with two other banks, pursuant to which each bank committed to loan
Pengo Industries, Inc. (Pengo), an oil and gas company, up to $30,000,000.
Soon thereafter, RepublicBank and the other lenders modified the agreement
to increase Pengo's available credit to a maximum of $40,000,000 per bank.
RepublicBank sold a participation of its additional $10,000,000 credit obligation to Royal Bank of Canada (RBC). The participation agreement authorized RepublicBank, in its discretion, to request RBC to fund up to the
full $10,000,000. From March 25 to April 28, 1982, RBC advanced
$5,800,000. RepublicBank sold participations to its correspondent banks
and used the proceeds of such sales to repay RBC. Shortly thereafter, Pengo
began experiencing significant financial difficulties. On July 14, 1982,
RepublicBank listed Pengo on its insolvent loan watchlist. In late 1982,
RepublicBank called on RBC to fund the full $10,000,000 participation, and
RBC complied. Pengo defaulted and RBC brought suit asserting, among
other things, that RepublicBank breached the terms of the participation
196. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
198. 792 S.W.2d at 829.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
201. Section 1823(e) will bar a claim that is not based on a contemporaneous writing, approved by the institution's Board (or a delegated committee thereof) with such approval being
reflected in the minutes and such writing being and continuously remaining an official record.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(e)(1)-(4) (1989).
202. 733 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
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agreement. FDIC-Receiver for RepublicBank asserted that D'Oench Duhme
and section 1823(e) barred RBC's claims.
RBC contended that RepublicBank had orally agreed that RBC's obligation to fund the participation would be on a last-in, first-out (LIFO) basis.
FDIC-Receiver asserted that the tandem of D'Oench Duhme and section
1823(e) barred a claim based on an oral representation. RBC responded
that: (i) cases interpreting section 1823(e) are inapplicable to the application
of D'Oench Duhme, (ii) D'Oench Duhme is inapplicable outside the lenderborrower relationship, and (iii) the FDIC's knowledge of RBC's claim precluded the FDIC's use of D'Oench Duhme.
The RBC court stated that D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) are pari
rationae.20 3 Accordingly, interpretations of section 1823(e) apply to
D'Oench Duhme. The RBC court also stated that the capacity in which a
party interacted with the failed institution is irrelevant in determining
whether D'Oench Duhme applies. 2°4 Instead, the issue is whether the party
lent itself to a "scheme or arrangement" likely to deceive banking authorities. 20 5 RBC's failure to obtain written representations from RepublicBank
caused such a side agreement to be unenforceable. Lastly, the court, citing a
litany of cases, held that the FDIC's prior knowledge of a claim will not
preclude application of D'Oench Duhme.206 Thus, D'Oench Duhme barred
RBC's claims of misrepresentation.
The court reached a different conclusion regarding RBC's alleged breach
of contract claim. The participation agreement provided that RepublicBank
"shall exercise the same care that [RepublicBank] exercise[s] in the making
and handling of loans for [its] own account." 20 7 RBC asserted that RepublicBank breached this contractual duty when it, among other things, requested RBC to fund its participation despite Pengo's deteriorating
condition, and used such funds to repay RepublicBank's correspondent
banks. FDIC-Receiver countered that RBC was alleging breach of specific
duties that were not set forth in the participation agreement; thus, such obligations were barred by D'Oench Duhme.
The RBC court held that the participation agreement fully reflected
RepublicBank's due care duty. 20 8 Accordingly, it was irrelevant that RBC
would need to resort to evidence that was not contained in the participation
agreement in order to prove its case. D'Oench Duhme requires the representations, and not the evidence proving breach of such representations, to be in
writing in the bank's files. 2°9 Thus, D'Oench Duhme did not bar RBC's
210
breach of contract claims.
The RBC decision affords some certainty to loan participants. The rela203. Id. at 1095.
204. Id. at 1096.
205. Id.

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 1097.
Id. (bracketed material in original).
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Id.
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tionship between a lead lender and a participant is contractual. After RBC,
the relationship between the FDIC and a participant will be governed by the
terms of the contract between the original parties. Consequently, the FDIC
cannot escape liability for breach of the failed institution's duties under the
participation agreement by relying on D'Oench Duhme.

c. Availability of D'Oench Duhme and Section 1823(e) to Other Parties. The parties armed with the tandem of D'Oench Duhme and section

1823(e) proliferated during the survey period primarily as a result of the
provisions of FIRREA.
(i) Bridge Banks. In Bell & Murphy & Associates, Inc. v. Interfirst
Bank Gateway, N.A.,21 1 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit extended
the protections afforded by D'Oench Duhme to cover a bridge bank (NCNB
Texas National Bank). 2 12 The Bell & Murphy court reasoned that the failure
to provide such protection to a bridge bank would undermine the efficacy of
the bridge bank as a means of resolving insolvent banks. 21 3 The district
court in Fairv. NCNB Texas National Bank 2 14 also concluded that D'Oench
21 5
Duhme applies to bridge banks.
211. 894 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 244 (1990). FIRREA expressly extended § 1823(e) to bridge banks. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement

Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-3, § 214, 103 Stat. 183, 249 (1989) (codified as 12
U.S.C. § 1821(n)(4)(1)). See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(n)(4)(1).
Curiously, the Bell & Murphy court believed that 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) was not applicable to
FDIC-Receiver. 894 F.2d at 753. Although § 1823(e) previously was only available to the
FDIC-Corporate, Congress, when it adopted FIRREA, specifically extended the protections
afforded by the statute to include FDIC-Receiver, among others. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 212(a), 103
Stat. 183, 231 (1989) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A)) ("[A]ny agreement that does not
meet the requirements set forth in section 1823(e) shall not form the basis of, or substantially
compromise, a claim against the receiver or the Corporation [FDIC]." 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1821(d)(9)(A) (1989)). Thus, the court apparently failed to recognize that the law had been
changed.
212. 894 F.2d at 754-55. Congress authorized the FDIC to create a bridge bank to serve as
a temporary receptacle for certain of the assets and liabilities of a failed bank until a permanent
solution could be devised. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 214, 103 Stat. 183, 246-52 (1989) (codified as 12
U.S.C. § 1821(n); See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(n) (1989).
213. 894 F.2d at 754.
214. 733 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
The Faircourt's decision is not surprising after the decision reached by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Bell & Murphy. See supra text accompanying notes 211-213. The Fair
court's interpretation of the terms of the purchase and assumption agreement (P&A Agreement) between the FDIC and NCNB Texas National Bank, N.A. (NCNB) that is more noteworthy. Under the terms of the P&A Agreement, the only relevant liabilities NCNB assumed
were liabilities arising from any claims or "litigation brought by the Failed Bank [First RepublicBank Waco, N.A.] as of Bank Closing against third parties and related to any asset of the
Failed Bank purchased by the Assuming Bank [NCNB]." Id. at 1102. The Fair court determined that the language of the P&A Agreement was effective to limit the liabilities NCNB
assumed. Id. The Fair court's interpretation offers assignees from the FDIC or RTC, as receiver, broader protection from any claims whatsoever when the receiver and the assignee
agreed that such claims would not be transferred.
215. 733 F. Supp. at 1102-03.
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(ii) Purchaserof Assets. In Porrasv. Petroplex Savings Association,2 16
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit extended the protections provided
by D'Oench Duhme to private assignees from the FDIC.21 7 The Porras
court reasoned that affording private purchasers of assets from the FDIC
with the protections provided by D'Oench Duhme expands the pool of potential purchasers for the assets and liabilities of insolvent institutions and this
competition enhances the prices such purchasers are willing to pay, thereby
minimizing the cost to the insurance fund of resolving insolvent
2 18
institutions.
(iii) Subsidiaries. The decision in FSLIC v. T.F. Stone-Liberty Land
Associates,2 19 discussed earlier,2 20 also held that defenses available to the
FSLIC are available to wholly-owned service corporation subsidiaries of
failed thrift institutions. 22' The Stone court reasoned that certain of the
principles of D'Oench Duhme-reliance on the records of financial institutions and protection of the insurance fund-are equally applicable to claims
against subsidiaries of insolvent thrifts. 222 Thus, the policies underlying
D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) could be defeated if the court failed to
extend such protections to subsidiaries of parent financial institutions in
223
receivership.
2. FederalHolder in Due Course Rule
a. Prerequisitesfor Application. In Gunter v. Hutcheson 224 the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit gave birth to a federal common law defense
of holder in due course (HDC) status. 225 This defense was modelled on the
HDC Rule contained in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).2 26 The federal HDC rule, however, differs in certain respects from its UCC counterpart. To be a HDC under section 3-302 of the UCC, a holder must acquire a
negotiable instrument (a) for "value," and (b) in "good faith" and (c) "without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against
or claim to it on the part of any person." 227 The UCC also provides that a
holder cannot be a HDC if it acquires the instrument by purchasing it at a
judicial sale, taking it under legal process, acquiring it by taking over an
estate or purchasing it in a bulk transaction outside the ordinary course of
business. 228 The Gunter court eliminated the requirement that a party must
acquire an instrument in the ordinary course of business to attain HDC sta216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

903 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 381.
Id.
787 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ granted).
See supra text accompanying notes 111-134.
787 S.W.2d at 488-89.
Id. at 489.
Id.
674 F.2d 862, 873 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
674 F.2d at 873.
See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.302(a)(1)-(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
Id. § 3-302(c).
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tus when an instrument is acquired in a P&A transaction. 229 Accordingly,
the Gunter court afforded the FDIC with federal common law HDC status
despite the FDIC's having acquired the assets of a failed bank in bulk. The
cases decided during the survey period may significantly expand the applicability of federal HDC status by making it available without satisfying the
UCC prerequisites.
In B.L. Nelson & Associates v. Sunbelt Savings, FSB230 Judge Fitzwater
was called upon to interpret the federal HDC Rule. He was asked to determine whether the FSLIC acquired a note without knowledge of any personal
defenses. 23 ' In 1983, Nelson Associates purchased raw land (Trophy Club)
in Denton County, Texas with the proceeds of a loan from Independent
American Savings Association (State Association) secured by the Trophy
Club property and individually guaranteed by B.L. Nelson. Allegedly, State
Association agreed to finance the development of Trophy Club. Nelson Associates, however, later learned that deed restrictions prevented the property
from being developed as planned. In 1985, Nelson Engineering purchased
certain property (Thornbush) with a loan from State Association, secured by
the Thornbush property and guaranteed by B.L. Nelson.
In 1987, State Association failed, and the FHLBB created Independent
American Savings Association, F.S.L.A. (Federal Association). Federal Association entered into a P&A transaction with State Association and acquired the Nelson entity notes and B.L. Nelson guarantees. The parties
attempted to "work out" the Trophy Club note but the discussions collapsed, allegedly because Federal Association insisted that such negotiations
include the Thornbush note.
The Nelson entities brought certain state common law claims against Federal Association. Federal Association later failed and Sunbelt Savings,
F.S.B. (Sunbelt) acquired the notes and guarantees at issue pursuant to a
P&A transaction. Sunbelt counterclaimed against B.L. Nelson on his guarantees and against the Nelson entities.
The Nelson court considered whether the claims and defenses of B.L. Nelson and the Nelson entities were barred by the federal HDC Rule.232 The
court dismissed Nelson's argument that the HDC Rule should not apply
because State Association was under the FSLIC's control,233and thus, the
FSLIC participated in the allegedly inappropriate conduct.
The court stated that the FSLIC is presumed to be a HDC.2 34 Mere allegations regarding the FSLIC's knowledge will not overcome this presumption. In addition, the FSLIC is not presumed to know of the borrower's
229. 674 F.2d at 873.

230. 733 F. Supp. 1106 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
231. Id. at 1110-12.

232. Id.
233. Id. at 1111. Cf. FSLIC v. Locke, 718 F. Supp. 573, 583 (W.D. Tex. 1989). (court
rejected borrower's contentions that FHLBB, by chartering new thrift institution and installing institution's officers and staff, exercised sufficient dominion and control over thrift institution to preclude institution from being able to raise D'Oench Duhme as defense)
234. Id. at 1111.
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personal defenses merely from the existence of litigation or the FSLIC's actions in examining the institution. 235 The knowledge of an officer of State
Association, Federal Association and Sunbelt generally cannot be imputed
to the FSLIC because the FSLIC is an entirely separate entity. 236 Thus, the
FDIC, as successor to the FSLIC,.was a HDC. The Nelson court held that
usury defense was a personal defense, which is unavailable against a
Nelson's
237
HDC.

In Sunbelt Savings, FSB, Dallas, Texas v. Amrecorp Realty Corp.,238 the
court examined whether the FSLIC could be a HDC under the federal common law rule even if it had knowledge of the defenses of the maker of the
instrument.2 39 Sherwood Blount and Amrecorp Realty Corporation (collectively, Amrecorp) had guaranteed certain notes made to Sunbelt Service
Corporation, which, in turn, assigned such notes to Sunbelt Savings Association of Texas (Old Sunbelt). When the underlying obligor defaulted, Old
Sunbelt sued Amrecorp to require payment on the guarantees. Amrecorp
counterclaimed asserting Old Sunbelt had sought usurious interest.
Old Sunbelt was declared insolvent. Old Sunbelt entered into a P&A
agreement with the newly chartered Sunbelt Savings, F.S.B. (New Sunbelt).24° New Sunbelt acquired the guaranty agreements but FSLIC-Receiver retained Old Sunbelt's obligations to general creditors. Amrecorp
sought discovery from New Sunbelt and the FDIC (as successor to the
FSLIC) regarding their knowledge of Amrecorp's usury claim against Old
Sunbelt. The FDIC and New Sunbelt moved to quash Amrecorp's discovery
motion.
The Amrecorp court held that the FDIC, to qualify as a HDC, must acquire an asset in good faith and without any knowledge of the maker's personal defenses. 24 1 The court reasoned that if lack of knowledge were not a
prerequisite, then the federal HDC Rule would "swallow up" D'Oench
Duhme.242 Such an interpretation would have made it unnecessary for the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in FSLIC v. Murray,243 to apply both
D'Oench Duhme and the federal HDC Rule in combination. The Murray
court would have been able to dispense with the entire matter by applying
the HDC Rule. Thus, the Amrecorp court concluded that the knowledge of
the FSLIC, when it was appointed receiver, was relevant to whether the
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 1111 n.7.
Id. at 1111 n.8.
Id. at 1113.
730 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Tex.), reconsider, 742 F.Supp. 370 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
Id. at 745-46.
New Sunbelt was chartered by the former Federal Home Loan Bank Board. New

Sunbelt then entered into a P&A transaction with Old Sunbelt. No third party investors were
involved. New Sunbelt was equally as insolvent as Old Sunbelt because no new capital was
added. One purpose of this transaction was to afford New Sunbeft with the FSLIC's superpowers and to interpose the FSLIC between Old Sunbelt's assets and Old Sunbelt's general
creditors.
241. 730 F. Supp. at 745, 746.
242. Id. at 746.
243. 853 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1988).
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FDIC could claim HDC status. 244 Nonetheless, the court granted the mo245
tion to quash Amrecorp's discovery requests.
The court stated that Amrecorp's desire to take depositions and the documents sought were overly broad. 246 Amrecorp was not entitled to discovery
concerning possible personal defenses, which would be barred by HDC status, unless it provided an arguable basis for Amrecorp to overcome the presumption of HDC status. 247 Instead, Amrecorp was only entitled to submit
interrogatories tailored to the issue of the FSLIC's knowledge when it was
appointed receiver.248 The FDIC contended that even such limited discovery was too broad. According to the FDIC, Amrecorp still would be estopped from raising a usury claim by D'Oench Duhme even if the FSLIC
knew of such claim at the time it was appointed receiver. The court concluded that it was too early to determine whether D'Oench Duhme would
defeat Amrecorp's usury claim.249 Accordingly, Judge Fitzwater held that
Amrecorp was entitled to pursue limited discovery in an effort to overcome
the presumption affording the FDIC with HDC status. Judge Fitzwater
later reconsidered 250 his Amrecorp decision in light of a subsequent opinion
by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
In Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC25 1 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit was asked to deny HDC status to the FDIC because the FDIC acquired assets (promissory notes) from a failed bank with notice that the
notes were overdue. Although the Campbell Leasing court was only asked
to address whether the FDIC was entitled to federal HDC status even if it
acquired a note with notice of dishonor, the court held that the FDIC and its
assignees enjoy HDC status irrespective of whether they meet the traditional
25 2
requirements of state law.
Judge Fitzwater had the first opportunity to interpret the scope of the
language in the Campbell Leasing decision. New Sunbelt, as assignee from
the FDIC, asked Judge Fitzwater to reconsider 2 53 his earlier ruling in
Amrecorp.254 Judge Fitzwater stated that the Campbell Leasing decision
clearly purported to alleviate the FDIC from meeting "any traditional" prerequisite for HDC status. 255 Judge Fitzwater then held that both New Sunbelt and the FDIC were entitled to federal HDC status. 256 Upon
244. 730 F. Supp. at 746.
245. Id. at 747.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. But see First City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 730 F. Supp. 501, 510-11
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (irrelevant whether FDIC, when it was appointed receiver, knew of failed
bank's oral misrepresentations because D'Oench Duhme would bar such misrepresentations).
250. See infra notes 253-257 and accompanying text.
251. 901 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1990).
252. Id. at 1249 ("[T]he FDIC and subsequent note holders enjoy holder in due course
status whether or not they satisfy the technical requirements of the state law.").
253. 742 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Tex.), reconsidering 730 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
254. See supra notes 238-249 and accompanying text..
255. 742 F. Supp. at 371 (emphasis in original).
256. Id. Judge Fitzwater also granted the FDIC's motion for a protective order because
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reconsideration, Judge Fitzwater did not reiterate his initial misgivings, as
expressed in his original Amrecorp ruling,2 5" that, if the traditional requirements for application of the federal HDC Rule were eliminated, then the
federal HDC Rule would supplant D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e).
Judge Fitzwater, however, did note that the Campbell Leasing interpretation
provided the FDIC with broader HDC protections than that applied by
other circuits. 253 Perhaps, Judge Fitzwater was implying that the reach of
the Campbell Leasing decision might be narrowed by subsequent interpretation. Nonetheless, Judge Fitzwater concluded that there was no basis for
distinguishing between the FDIC's alleged knowledge of notice of dishonor,
which did not prevent the FDIC from being a HDC in Campbell Leasing,
259
and the FDIC's alleged knowledge of Amrecorp's defenses.
b. Extension to Subsequent Assignees. The Nelson court also considered
whether Sunbelt was entitled to HDC status. 2W The court noted that the
Fifth Circuit had extended the availability of D'Oench Duhme to assignees
from the FSLIC.26 1 Thus, by analogy, federal HDC status is transferable as
well.
The Nelson court stated that such a conclusion is also supported by the
UCC. According to the court, the federal HDC Rule is modelled on the
UCC. 262 Under the UCC, HDC status can be vested in a subsequent transferee, provided that the transferee was not either a prior holder of the instrument who had knowledge of personal defenses or a party to certain
2 63
improprieties concerning the instrument.
Nelson apparently contended that Sunbelt and Federal Association were
the same holder of the instrument.2 64 Nelson also contended that Federal
Association, and not the FSLIC, engaged in the P&A transaction with Sunbelt. Nelson apparently was arguing that Sunbelt never succeeded to the
FSLIC's HDC status because the FSLIC never acquired the assets in question. The court, however, refused to ignore the separate legal existence of
Sunbelt and Federal Association, or question whether FSLIC-Receiver
transferred the assets. 265 Thus, Sunbelt's status as a HDC estopped Nelson
the Campbell Leasing decision rendered Amrecorp's discovery requests, regarding the FDIC's
knowledge, irrelevant. Id. at 371 n.2.
257. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
258. 742 F. Supp. at 371.
259. Id.
260. 733 F. Supp. at 1111. The Nelson court also determined whether FSLIC hac HDC

status without knowledge of any personal defenses. See supra notes 226-37 and accompanying
text.
261. Id. at 1112 (citing Bell & Murphy & Assoc. Inc. v. InterFirst Bank Gateway, N.A.,
894 F.2d 750, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1990)).
262. Id. at 1112-13.
263. 733 F. Supp. at 1113 citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3-201(l) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968)). Accord NCNB Texas National Bank v. Campise, 788 S.W.2d 115, 118-19
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (determining that FDIC vested its HDC
status in NCNB because under UCC's "Shelter Rule," UCC § 3-201, a transferee from a HDC
can also assert HDC privileges).
264. 733 F. Supp. at 1113 n.13.
265. Id.
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from asserting any personal defenses.
c. No ProtectionAgainst Counterclaims. In FDICv. Byrne2 6 Byrne contended that he repaid his notes to the failed Vernon Savings & Loan Association (Vernon), and that FDIC-Receiver's claims were barred by, among
other things, such payment. Byrne also raised certain lender liability theories as both defenses to the FDIC's action and as counterclaims. The Byrne
court concluded that the FDIC's status as a HDC barred Byrne's defenses
but not his claims. 267 The court noted that the FDIC was involved in the
litigation in two capacities. 268 The FDIC was both the transferee of certain
of the assets and liabilities of Vernon and the party that assumed certain of
Vernon's liabilities, including any liability to Byrne. Byrne's claims against
the FDIC survived HDC challenge because the FDIC had succeeded to the
contingent claims that could have been raised against Vernon had it continued to exist. 269 The federal HDC Rule does not prevent a party from raising
personal claims against the alleged wrongdoer. In this case, the FDIC simply assumed the responsibility of the wrongdoer-Vernon-to a contingent
270
claimant-Byrne.
II. FAILED BANK LITIGATION
A.

Purchase and Assumption Transactions

FDIC-Receiver contractually agrees to provide investors and other financial institutions with indemnification from certain claims in order to encourage such parties to "bid" to acquire failed banks in P&A transactions.
The case of Successor Trust Committee v. FirstState Bank 271 considered the
interplay between a fiduciary's duty under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA), 272 and P&A transactions.
On October 30, 1983, the Comptroller declared the National Bank of
Odessa (NBO) insolvent and appointed the FDIC as receiver. FDIC-Receiver then entered into a P&A transaction pursuant to which it transferred
certain of the assets and liabilities of NBO to First State Bank of Odessa,
N.A. (FSBO). FDIC-Receiver also entered into an indemnity agreement
(the Indemnity Agreement) with FSBO, which provided that the FDIC
would indemnify FSBO for any action FSBO pursued at the direction of
FDIC-Receiver or FDIC-Corporate. Moreover, FDIC-Corporate agreed to
indemnify FSBO for any claims based upon FSBO's failure to seek damages
266. 736 F. Supp. 727, 729 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
267. Id. at 730-31.
268. Id. at 730.
269. Id. at 730-31.
270. Although Byrne's claims were not barred by the federal HDC Rule, he was nonethe-

less estopped from raising them by D'Oench Duhme. Id. at 731. Byrne lent himself to a
scheme designed to mislead the examiners by failing both to obtain his canceled promissory
notes when he allegedly repaid them and to ensure that Vernon correctly credited his account.
Id. at 732-33. Thus, the FDIC used the combination of the federal HDC Rule and D'Oench
Duhme to defeat Byrne's claims and defenses.
271. 735 F. Supp. 708, 710-19 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
272. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 - 1461 (1985 & Supp. 1990).
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for the2 73
actions engaged in by NBO or FDIC-Receiver prior to the closure of
NBO.
As a result of the P&A transaction, FSBO succeeded NBO as trustee
under certain employee pension plans. NBO had caused such plans to loan
funds secured primarily by real estate. FSBO quickly realized that, in light
of certain self-dealing transactions in which NBO had engaged, such investments were prohibited transactions under ERISA. FSBO and its parent requested that FDIC-Corporate purchase such investments because they were
made by NBO prior to the P&A transaction. The minutes of the March 20,
1984, FSBO Trust Committee meeting reflected that the FDIC refused to
purchase the assets originally acquired by NBO, as trustee, in prohibited
transactions. In addition, FDIC-Corporate sent FSBO a letter stating that
FSBO, as the successor trustee to NBO, was responsible for administering
accounts, and could do so without the need to obtain FDIC approval for its
actions. Nonetheless, over the next five years, the parties continued to negotiate whether the FDIC would purchase such trust assets.
During this time, the borrowers stopped servicing the loans that served as
trust assets and the real estate collateral securing these loans deteriorated.
Between May 6, 1987, and May 2, 1989, FSBO foreclosed on the collateral
.securing all of the loans. FSBO did not notify beneficiaries of the estates that
the assets in question were deteriorating or that such assets were acquired in
prohibited transactions. On the contrary, according to the court, the statements sent to the beneficiaries were "highly misleading. '274 Once the beneficiaries of the pension plans learned of the investment losses, they brought
suit against FSBO.
The Successor Trust court concluded that FSBO was a fiduciary under
ERISA for several reasons. 275 First, the P&A agreement appointed FSBO
substitute trustee. 276 Second, FSBO acknowledged at its March 20, 1984,
Trust Committee meeting that the FDIC deemed FSBO to be a fiduciary
with respect to the pension plans. 277 Third, FSBO charged a fee for its serv2 78
ices and held investment authority for the plans.
As a fiduciary, FSBO was required to act prudently. 27 9 The court held
that FSBO's failure to liquidate promptly the assets acquired in prohibited
transactions constituted a breach of that duty. 280 The FDIC's behavior did
not excuse FSBO's inaction. Of course, FSBO was entitled to negotiate a
settlement with the FDIC. FSBO, however, should have contemporane2 81
ously pursued actions to benefit the plans.
273. The Indemnity Agreement also protected FSBO from "[a]ny and all claims whatsoever... based upon any action by the Bank [NBO], its directors, officers, or agents... prior to
the Bank Closing .).
Id. at 711.
274. Id. at 714.

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 715.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988)).
Id. at 716.
Id.
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The Indemnity Agreement protected FSBO for actions taken before the
P&A transaction. 282 FSBO, however, did not assume liability on the day
after the P&A transaction was consummated. 283 Implicitly, the Successor
Trust court gave FSBO some time to discern the existence of the prohibited
transactions and to consider alternatives before liability for breach of duty
attached. Although evidence was produced that indicated that FSBO knew
of the prohibited transactions as of October 1, 1983 (the date of the P&A
transaction), the court calculated the plans' damages from May 1, 1984 (the
date of the Trust Committee meeting at which FSBO acknowledged that the
284
FDIC had disclaimed responsibility for the administration of the plans).
After this window period passed, however, FSBO became responsible for
any losses incurred from its own inaction.
The Successor Trust court then considered whether the FDIC had agreed
to indemnify FSBO for such losses. The Indemnity Agreement, by its own
terms, did not protect FSBO for actions that occurred after consummation
of the P&A transaction. FSBO contended that it had relied on the statements of various FDIC officials concerning the asserted willingness of the
FDIC to purchase the assets at issue. The court stated that the representations and opinions of various FDIC employees were protected by the discretionary function exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 285 Thus,
286
FSBO's indemnification claims were barred.
Lastly, the Successor Trust court considered whether the members of
FSBO's Trust Committee were personally liable for the fiduciary duty violations committed by FSBO. 287 The court noted that these individuals acted
exclusively in their official capacity. In addition, FSBO approved the course
of conduct they pursued. Thus, the court did not hold these individuals
288
liable.
B. Insolvency
Texas American Bancshares,Inc. v. Clarke289 involved a challenge to the
manner in which the Comptroller of the Currency (the Comptroller), the
FDIC and the Banking Commissioner of Texas (the Commissioner) determined that twelve of the subsidiary banks of Texas American Bancshares,
Inc. (TAB Holding) were insolvent. 290 On July 20, 1989, the Comptroller
declared ten of TAB Holding's subsidiary banks, including Texas American
Bank/Fort Worth (TAB/FTW), insolvent and appointed the FDIC as re282. Id. The court found that "neither the FDIC nor FSBO shall be accountable for the
wrongdoing of NBO prior to FDIC's takeover [appointment as receiver] of the failed bank."
Id. Accord First Nat'l Bank of Andrews v. FDIC, 707 F. Supp. 265, 271 (W.D. Tex. 1989)

(successor bank did not assume any liability for the failed bank's breach of fiduciary duty).
283. 735 F. Supp. at 716.
284. Id. at 718.
285. Id. at 716 & n.4 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988)).
286. Id. at 717.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. 740 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Tex. 1990).

290. Id. at 1244-1254.
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ceiver of those banks. The FDIC then entered into a P&A agreement transferring to a bridge bank (Bridge Bank) 29 1 certain of the assets and liabilities
of the insolvent TAB Holding bank subsidiaries. Among the liabilities not
assumed by the Bridge Bank pursuant to the P&A Agreement were
TAB/FTW's obligations for federal funds purchased from the twelve TAB
Holding bank subsidiaries that had not yet been declared insolvent (the
Plaintiff Banks) and certain deposits placed with TAB/FTW by the Plaintiff
Banks. FDIC-Receiver then notified the Comptroller and the Commissioner
that the Plaintiff Banks would receive no more than 67% of the face amount
of those liabilities owed by TAB/FTW and not assumed by the Bridge Bank,
which percentage allegedly equalled the percentage that would have been
recovered for those liabilities by the Plaintiff Banks upon a liquidation of
TAB/FTW. The FDIC's notification resulted in the Comptroller and the
Commissioner declaring the Plaintiff Banks insolvent. Both the Comptroller
and the Commissioner admitted that, had the TAB/FTW liabilities owing to
the Plaintiff Banks been paid or assumed in full, they would not have declared the Plaintiff Banks insolvent. TAB Holding and the Plaintiff Banks
sued the Comptroller, the Commissioner, and the FDIC, both in its corporate capacity and as receiver of the Plaintiff Banks. The parties agreed that
if TAB Holding and the Plaintiff Banks prevailed, their recovery would be
limited to $5,000,000, which would be paid by the FDIC.
The Texas American opinion first observed that section 194 of the National Bank Act of 1864, as amended (NBA), 292 requires that a ratable distribution of an insolvent bank's assets be made to its creditors, and that
294
section 91 of the NBA 293 provides that any preferential transfer is void.
The court noted that when these provisions were written P&A transactions
were unknown, but stated that these provisions nonetheless indicated a congressional intent that the governmental agencies charged with winding up a
failed bank act fairly toward all of the failed bank's creditors and not give a
preference to any creditor. 295 The FDIC contended that the NBA merely
required that a creditor of TAB/FTW receive a ratable distribution of the
bank's assets as if the bank had been liquidated, and that the creditors whose
claims had been transferred to the Bridge Bank had received "enhanced"
payments from the FDIC that were not barred by section 91 of the NBA.296
The Texas American court rejected the FDIC's arguments, noting that every
court that had addressed the question of distributions to failed banks' creditors had required parity in treatment among creditors. 297 The court concluded that sections 91 and 94 of the NBA prohibited the FDIC from
291.
292.
293.
294.

See supra note 46.
12 U.S.C. § 194 (1988) (made applicable to the FDIC by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1988)).
12 U.S.C. § 91 (1988) (made applicable to the FDIC by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1988)).
740 F. Supp. at 1249.

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. 740 F. Supp. at 1250-52; see White v. Knox, 111 U.S. 784, 786 (1884); Woodbridge
Plaza v. Bank of Irvine, 815 F.2d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 1987); First Empire Bank-New York v.
FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978); MBank New Braunfels, N.A. v. FDIC, 721 F. Supp. 120, 123-24 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
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preferring some creditors of TAB/FTW over others and that no authority
existed for limiting the recovery of any of TAB/FTW's creditors to the liqui298
dation value of their claims.
The Texas American case was the first decision imposing liability on the
FDIC for causing the insolvency of otherwise solvent banks belonging to the
same holding company system. MBank New Braunfels, N.A. v. FDIC299
involved a challenge to FDIC actions that was similar to the challenge in
Texas American, and the MBank New Braunfels court also stated that unequal treatment of different creditors violated the NBA.3 °° However, the
MBank New Braunfels court did not grant the plaintiff the relief sought due
to jurisdictional and procedural considerations in that proceeding. 30' The
significance of Texas American is undercut by a provision of FIRREA that
specifically provides that the liability of the FDIC to a creditor arising from
a bank insolvency is limited to the amount that the creditor would have
received upon a liquidation of the bank 302 and a second provision of FIR303
REA authorizing the FDIC to prefer one class of creditors over another.
Thus, in light of these FIRREA provisions the importance of the Texas
American holding for post-FIRREA failures is negligible. Given the foregoing, perhaps the most significant aspect of the Texas American opinion is the
court's concern regarding the Comptroller's and the FDIC's observance of
the rights of third parties affected by bank insolvencies. The court at one
point declared the "appearance of impropriety" in the FDIC deciding in its
corporate and receivership roles what each creditor will receive to be "quite
worrisome." 30 4 The court also stated that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has been "wary of the FDIC's and Comptroller's claims of unbridled
discretion" in addressing bank failures. 30 5 The Texas American case may
indicate the reluctance of the courts to agree readily with the actions of bank
regulatory agencies, absent clear Congressional intent to the contrary, when
those actions treat parties in the same position differently. This reluctance
could be of considerable importance as the large amount of litigation generated by the accelerating deterioration of the nation's financial system proceeds through the courts.
C. Preferences
In
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether the actions of the Board of the former Century National Bank
(CNB) and its principal shareholder, Billy B. Goldberg (Goldberg), consti307
tuted a preference under section 91 of the NBA.
FDICv. Goldberg30 6 the

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

740 F. Supp at 1252-53.
721 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
Id. at 124.
Id. at 126-27.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(i)(2) (1989). See supra note 83.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(i)(3)(A) (1989).
740 F. Supp. at 1253.
Id. at 1254.
906 F.2d 1087, 1088-96 (5th Cir. 1990).
12 U.S.C. § 91 (1988).
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In September 1986, CNB's failure was imminent. CNB needed approximately $2,500,000 in order to meet capital adequacy guidelines. 30 8 The directors of CNB, recognizing the bank's plight, had authorized the
preparation of an offering circular to be used to raise such funds.30 9 The
offering circular was required to be reviewed by the Comptroller's Securities
and Corporate Practices Division, 3 10 which review was usually at least a
four- to six-week process. CNB did not have such time. The FDIC already
had prepared a bid package to distribute to prospective acquirors.
To avoid CNB's insolvency, on September 19, 1986, Goldberg and certain
other investors injected $470,000 into CNB. 311 Such funds were intended to
restore CNB temporarily to solvency while the Comptroller completed its
review of CNB's offering circular. According to the district court, the
Comptroller represented that such a capital injection would remedy CNB's
immediate problems, and that the Comptroller would expedite processing of
CNB's offering circular. 312 This capital injection, however, did not return
CNB to solvency because certain of CNB's accounts payable had not been
included in the calculations.
At a Board meeting on September 24, 1986, a representative of the Comptroller stated that CNB was again insolvent and immediate action was necessary. 3 13 According to the district court, the Comptroller also stated that it
was suspending review of CNB's offering circular pending an examination of
CNB. 314 Apparently, Goldberg determined that his efforts to save CNB
were futile, and he asked the CNB Board to rescind the September 19, 1986,
capital injection. The Board agreed and, among other things, directed management to credit part of the proceeds of the rescission to satisfy a loan
Goldberg owed to CNB. Both CNB's President and Cashier resigned, rather
than record the rescission of the stock sale and the credit to Goldberg's loan.
The Comptroller subsequently closed the bank.
FDIC-Receiver brought suit to collect on Goldberg's loan to CNB.
Goldberg contended that this loan had been satisfied with part of the proceeds of the rescinded stock sale. Goldberg also asserted that rescission was
proper because the capital injection had been made based upon the Comp308. In 1986, the process for resolving a failed bank lasted three days. Typically, on a
Tuesday, the FDIC-Receiver would convene a bidders meeting, accept bids, and declare a
winning bidder. The winning bidder and the FDIC would execute the P&A agreement and
other related contracts. The documents would be placed in escrow pending the bank closing at
the end of the day on either Thursday or Friday. The next day, the doors would be opened
under the charter of the successful bidder.
This process has changed in recent years. Now, before a bank is closed, the FDIC-Receiver
schedules bidders to conduct a due diligence evaluation of the operations and condition of the
failed bank. Accordingly, the resolution process for a failed bank usually requires four to six
weeks, at a minimum, to complete.
309. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, FDIC v. Goldberg, No. H-88-180 (S.D.
Tex. filed Jan. 4, 1988) [hereinafter "Goldberg Order"].
310. See 12 C.F.R. 16 (1990).
311. Goldberg and a company he controlled supplied $370,000 of the $470,000 raised.
312. Goldberg Order, supra note 309, at 2.
313. 906 F.2d at 1089.
314. Goldberg Order, supra note 309, at 2.
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troller's misrepresentations. In response, the FDIC asserted that the rescis31 5
sion was a preference under section 91 of the NBA.
The Goldberg court stated that a transfer to a creditor made in contemplation of a bank's insolvency is void as a preference. 31 6 The facts introduced at
trial indicated that the CNB Board was well aware of CNB's precarious
financial condition. Accordingly, the CNB Board knew or should have
31 7
known that CNB's closure was imminent.
Goldberg contended that a transaction could not be a preference unless it
was made with the intent to prefer. The Goldberg court stated that an intent
to prefer can be inferred from the Board's conduct. 31 8 The court stated that
one purpose of section 91 is to prevent insiders from benefitting at the expense of creditors gerferally. 31 9 The court deemed Goldberg to be an insider
because, despite his lack of official status or authority, he was able to direct
CNB's affairs. 320 The court stated that insiders cannot be permitted to claim
and realize an advantage available to them because of their positions with
the bank. 321 Otherwise, the limited assets of the bank and confidence in the
banking system would soon be exhausted. Thus, the rescission of the stock
sale was void as a preference.

315. Title 12 U.S.C. § 91 provides:
All transfers of the notes, bonds, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt
owing to any national banking association, or of deposits to its credit; all assignments of mortgages, sureties on real estate, or of judgments or decrees in its
favor; all deposits of money, bullion, or other valuable thing for its use, or for
the use of any of its shareholders or creditors; and all payments of money to
either, made after the commission of an act of insolvency, or in contemplation
thereof, made with a view to prevent the application of its assets in the manner
prescribed [by this chapter], or with a view to the preference of one creditor to

another, except in payment of its circulating notes, shall be utterly null and void

12 U.S.C. § 91 (1988).
316. 906 F.2d at 1091.
317. Id. at 1091-92.
318. Id. at 1093.
319. Id. at 1094.
320. Goldberg was neither an officer nor a member of CNB's board of directors; nonetheless, he appeared to exercise substantial control. Id. at 1094 n.21. Goldberg also would have
been an insider under Regulation 0. See 12 C.F.R. 215.20) (1990) (Goldberg was a "principal
shareholder").
321. 906 F.2d at 1095.
The district court apparently concluded that the Comptroller misrepresented to Goldberg
and the other directors of CNB that $470,000 was sufficient to return the bank to solvency.
Attorneys for Goldberg read the district court decision as "put[ting] the comptroller of the
currency [sic] on notice that it will be responsible for representations it makes to investors
.Green,
Law: US. Judge Rules Regulators Misled Bank Shareholders,WALL ST. J.,
Jan.
13, 1989, at B-2, col. 4 (Southwestern ed.). Effectively, the district court barred the FDIC's
action in light of the Comptroller's allegedly impermissible conduct. In contrast, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Goldberg's claim that he should be entitled to a set-off
under equitable principles in light of the Comptroller's allegedly false representations. The
court stated that Goldberg did not plead or prove that the Comptroller engaged in fraud. 906
F.2d at 1095 n.24.
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D.

Disaffirmance of Contracts

The case of Harris v. Western Best, Inc.322 involved a controversy over
two notes payable to a bank that subsequently failed and for which the
FDIC was appointed receiver. FDIC-Receiver transferred the notes to the
FDIC-Corporate, which then transferred the notes to Western Best, Inc.
(Western). Western refused to advance any additional funds on the notes
despite provisions in the notes providing for such advances. Western sued to
recover on the notes, which were past due, and the makers of the notes counterclaimed,'alleging that Western had breached the terms of the notes. The
trial court granted Western's motion for summary judgment, and the makers
appealed.
The appeals court analyzed this case by addressing whether the FDIC, in
either its receivership or corporate capacity, was under a legal duty to honor
the failed bank's commitment to fund future advances.3 23 The court determined that the FDIC had no such duty. 324 The court reasoned that the
FDIC's function is to protect depositors' interests and liquidate an insolvent
bank's assets, and analogized partially funded loans to executory contracts
of an insolvent institution that may be repudiated by FDIC-Receiver.3 25 As
the FDIC had no duty to advance funds, the appeals court concluded that
Western, as the FDIC's assignee, was similarly situated; accordingly, the
3 26
court affirmed the lower court's judgment.
III. BANKERS' BLANKET BONDS
A.

Standing

In Warfield v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.32 7 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit addressed the question of whether the majority shareholders of a
failed bank possessed standing to pursue a cause of action against the issuer
of the bank's blanket bond. The plaintiffs contended that the bank's insurer
owed them a duty of good faith, which the insurer allegedly breached. The
plaintiffs also relied on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which affords a cause of action to "any person" harmed by a person in the insurance
3 28
business who engages in certain unfair or deceptive acts.
The Warfield court stated that the term "any person" is limited to parties
with a "direct and close relationship" to.the wrongdoer. 329 The court held
that plaintiffs' nexus with the defendant was not sufficient to afford them
with standing under the statute.330 Plaintiffs lacked standing for another
reason, apart from the Insurance Code. This additional reason was not dis322. 795 S.W.2d 347, 348-49 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
323. Id. at 349.
324. Id.
325. Id. The ability of the FDIC to repudiate contracts in its receivership capacity is governed by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e). See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e) (1989).
326. 795 S.W.2d at 349.
327. 904 F.2d 322, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1990).
328. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
329. 904 F.2d at 326.
330. Id.
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cussed by the court. Shareholders do not possess standing to assert generalized injuries. Instead, any claim against the insurer should have belonged to
33
FDIC-Receiver. 1
B.

Interpretation

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Reliance Insurance v. CapitalBancshares/CapitalBank,332 was asked to interpret the provisions of Reliance Insurance Company's standard blanket bond. An individual named
Bob Coats (Coats) caused certain stock certificates to be printed purporting
to represent shares of common stock of American International Group, Inc.
(AIG), which at that time was a publicly traded company on the over-thecounter (O-T-C) market. Coats assumed that AIG stock would possess the
same characteristics as Q-T-C stocks generally. Coats' fake certificates also
reflected the correct par value and the correct names of AIG's President and
Secretary. Nonetheless, the certificates Coats printed possessed many obvious differences from authentic AIG stock in such areas as the pictorial on
the top of the certificate, CUSIP number, and sizes and coloring of the certificates; the certificates also lacked the same legends as authentic shares and
the certificates included an inaccurate recitation of the number of shares
authorized.
Capital Bank (Capital) and Sunbelt Bancorp. (Sunbelt) both extended
credit to Coats secured by the fraudulent AIG stock. Reliance Insurance
Company (Reliance) brought a declaratory judgment action asserting that
any losses suffered by Capital and Sunbelt were not covered by the blanket
bond Reliance had issued to them. Pursuant to the blanket bond, Reliance
had agreed to indemnify both Capital and Sunbelt for any losses either of
them suffered by, among other things, extending credit based upon original
securities that bore forged or counterfeit signatures. 333 The blanket bond
defined the term "Counterfeit" as "an imitation which is intended to deceive
and to be taken as an original" and the term "Forgery" as "the signing of the
name of another with intent to deceive." '334
The Reliance court affirmed the district court's judgment that the fraudulent stock certificates were not "counterfeit," as that term was used in the
blanket bond, because they were not, and were not intended to be, imitations
or copies of any genuine AIG stock certificate. 335 The district court had
reasoned that because no legitimate AIG certificates were ever issued to
Coats, the fraudulent certificates could not be imitations of any original cer331. Weinstock, Directors and Officers of Failing Banks: Pitfalls and Precautions, 106

BANKING L. J. 434, 444-55 (Shareholder only may bring an action if he suffers a personal
injury not experienced by all shareholders).

332. 912 F.2d 756, 757 (5th Cir. 1990).
333. The blanket bond provided coverage for losses incurred by extending credit "on the
faith of... any original Security [which either] bears a signature of any maker, drawer, issuer
...or any person signing in any other capacity which is a Forgery... [or] which is a Counterfeit." Id. at 762 (emphasis omitted).

334. Id.
335. Id. at 757.
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tificate. 336 The court then considered whether there had been a forgery that
directly resulted in the losses. Coats had forged the names of AIG's President and Secretary on his fraudulent certificates. The loss, however, did not
"result directly" from the forgery. 337 Even if the signatures on the certificates were genuine, the certificates still would have been fake, and Capital
and Sunbelt still would have suffered losses. Hence, neither Capital338
nor Sunbelt were entitled to recover from Reliance on the blanket bonds.
IV.

A.

LENDER LIABILITY LITIGATION

Usury and Tortious Interference with Contract

Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady 339 involved various lender liability
claims made against Victoria Bank & Trust Company (Victoria). Fancher
Cattle Company, Inc. (FCC) had entered into a partnership with Marlyn
Brady (Brady), and the partnership executed a note to Victoria. A portion
of the note proceeds was used as working capital for the partnership, and the
balance was used to retire a pre-existing debt owed by Brady that was secured with a lien on Brady's ranch. Victoria had required that this preexisting debt be retired so it could obtain a first lien on the ranch to secure
the partnership note. Victoria's officers repeatedly assured Bill Fancher
(Fancher), owner of FCC, that Victoria would not look to him or FCC for
repayment of that portion of the partnership debt incurred to retire Brady's
pre-existing debt. Approximately two years later, after calling the note, Victoria determined that foreclosure on Brady's ranch would not repay that
part of the partnership debt representing Brady's pre-existing debt. Victoria
subsequently refused to honor a draft presented by Fancher, which draft
Fancher had obtained in a nonpartnership transaction, unless Fancher forfeited $40,000 of the draft for application against that part of the partnership
debt arising from Brady's pre-existing debt. Victoria claimed the right to do
so under a security agreement Fancher had signed in connection with a nonpartnership note that had been fully repaid before presentation of the draft
in question. Victoria had retained the security agreement despite the nonpartnership's note's repayment, contrary to Victoria's standard policy.
When Victoria sued Brady, Fancher, and FCC to recover the deficiency on
the partnership note, the defendants counterclaimed on various bases. The
trial court found in favor of Fancher and FCC on all but two of their coun34°
terclaims, and Victoria, Fancher, and FCC all appealed.
The appeals court first examined certain issues on which the trial court
had found in Victoria's favor. 34 1 The appeals court reversed the trial court's
336. Id. at 764. The district court distinguished this case from a situation in which the
wrongdoer copies a genuine certificate issued to him. The district court stated that the copies
would be counterfeits.
337. Id. at 758.
338. Id.
339. 779 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ granted).
340. Id. at 898-900.
341. Id. at 901, 902.
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denial of Fancher's usury claim, citing Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold 342 for the
proposition that a lender that requires a borrower to assume a third party's
debt as a condition to making a loan must include the amount of the assumed debt in its interest computations. 343 The appeals court rejected Victoria's argument that this rule was inapplicable because the debt assumed by
Fancher was owed to a lender other than Victoria, noting that an identity of
lenders was not required by previous decisions and also noting that Fancher
did not assume Brady's debt until it was owed to Victoria and thus an identity of lenders did exist. 344 The court also rejected Victoria's argument that
no usury occurred because no benefit accrued to Victoria from Fancher's
assumption of Brady's debt. 34 5 The court stated that the mere charging of
excessive interest constitutes usury, and whether the lender benefits is
346
immaterial.
The court of appeals also examined several points of error alleged by Victoria with respect to the trial court's findings in favor of Fancher. The court
held that a broad form release executed by Fancher in favor of Victoria in
exchange for an extension of the partnership note and a cash payment did
not bar Fancher's claims. 347 The court concluded that Victoria obtained the
release to cloak the usurious nature of the transaction while Fancher was
unaware of his possible usury claim and that Fancher received no benefit to
which he was not already entitled in exchange for the release. 348 The relevant extension of the partnership note related only to that portion of the note
that represented Brady's pre-existing debt and was, according to the jury,
not Fancher's debt; the relevant cash payment was characterized as a "refund" at the time it was paid and was thus something to which Fancher was
349
already entitled.
The court of appeals also rejected Victoria's assertions that no evidence
existed showing that Victoria had interfered with the business relationship
between Fancher and the party who wrote the draft that Victoria had refused to honor. 350 The court held that, on the facts presented, evidence existed to support the jury's finding that Victoria interfered with Fancher's
business relationship without justification or excuse and with malice. 35 1
Victoria also challenged the amount of punitive damages awarded by the
jury to Fancher. The jury awarded actual damages of $495,000 and punitive
damages of $2,200,000.352 A portion of the jury's award was based on the
342. 661 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. 1983).
343. 779 S.W.2d at 900 (quoting 661 S.W.2d at 928).
344. Id. at 901.
345. Id.
346. Id. See also Danzinger v. San Jacinto Say. Ass'n, 732 S.W. 2d 300, 304 (Tex. 1987)
(whether borrower pays off loan is immaterial to usury claim since the mere charging of excessive interest is usury).
347. 779 S.W.2d at 904.

348. Id. at 903.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 906.
351. Id.

352. Id. at 911.
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jury's finding that Victoria had violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act (DTPA), 353 which limits punitive damage awards to three times actual
damages. 354 The appellate court noted that the jury had also found that
Victoria had committed tortious interference with a business relationship,
for which punitive damages may also be awarded. 3 5" The court of appeals
could not discern from the jury charge what portion of the punitive damages
was attributable to the tortious interference claim and what portion was attributable to the DTPA claim. 356 As Victoria had failed to object to the
format of the question before its submission to the jury, the court overruled
Victoria's point of error. 357 The court also rejected Victoria's contention
that the jury award was so excessive as to be manifestly unjust on the basis of
358
the evidence presented and the jury's findings.
B. Duty of Good Faith
The Texas Supreme Court in FDIC v. Coleman 359 addressed the question
of whether a secured party had owed a duty of good faith or fair dealing to
the guarantors of a debt to the secured party. 36° Judico Enterprises, Inc.
(Judico) executed a promissory note to First National Bank of Midland
(FNB Midland) secured by real estate during December 1981, and Coleman
and Powell, two principals of Judico, guaranteed payment of the note.
Shortly before the note matured, Judico filed for bankruptcy protection.
Thereafter, FNB Midland was declared insolvent and FDIC-Receiver succeeded to FNB-Midland's rights against Judico, Coleman and Powell. On
August 15, 1984, FDIC-Receiver obtained an agreed order from the bankruptcy court permitting it to foreclose on the real estate securing the note,
and FDIC-Receiver sold the real estate in a foreclosure sale on June 7, 1985.
A deficiency of approximately $486,000 remained following the foreclosure
sale, which deficiency FDIC-Receiver sought to recover from Coleman and
Powell as guarantors. The trial court granted summary judgment to FDICReceiver in its suit against Coleman and Powell. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the cause for trial, finding
that FDIC-Receiver had owed a duty of good faith to Coleman and Powell
and that a factual question existed as to whether FDIC-Receiver had
breached this duty through undue delay in*foreclosing on the real estate security during a period of declining property values, resulting in a lower fore361
closure sale price and a greater deficiency.
353. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.01 - 17.826 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1991).

354. The DTPA provides that a consumer prevailing under § 17.50 may obtain the amount
of actual damages suffered plus not more than three times the amount of actual damages in
excess of $1,000. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
355. 779 S.W.2d at 911.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 911-12.

359. 795 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990) (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 708-10.
361. Coleman v. FDIC, 762 S.W.2d 243, 245 (rex. App.-El Paso (1988), rev'd, 795
S.W.2d 706, 710 (rex. 1990).
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The Coleman court characterized the issue before it as whether a secured
creditor owes a guarantor of indebtedness a duty of good faith requiring the
creditor to liquidate collateral promptly to minimize the guarantor's liability
for any deficiency. 362 The Coleman court examined each of Coleman and
Powell's asserted bases for the existence of such a duty and rejected each in
turn.
Coleman and Powell first asserted that FDIC-Receiver had a duty of good
faith under section 1.203 of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code,363 which
provides that every contract subject to the Texas Uniform Commercial
Code 364 (UCC) imposes an obligation of good faith. The Coleman court
observed that, assuming the UCC was applicable in this instance, the UCC
defined good faith as honesty in fact. 365 The court then rejected section
1.203 as a source of liability for FDIC-Receiver's alleged breach of a duty of
good faith, noting that the guarantors' had not alleged that the FDIC was
dishonest, but that it had failed to exercise diligence which, under the UCC,
'3 66
is not required for good faith."
Coleman and Powell next asserted that FDIC-Receiver had a duty of
good faith under Texas common law. The Coleman court rejected this assertion by noting that a duty of good faith is not imposed in every contract but
only in special relationships marked by shared trust or an imbalance in bargaining power. 367 The court stated that the relationship between a creditor
and guarantor does not ordinarily create a duty of good faith and that Coleman and Powell had not asserted a special relationship that would give rise
368
to such a duty in this case.
Coleman and Powell's last asserted basis for FDIC-Receiver's duty of
good faith was federal common law. The Coleman court observed that the
case cited by Coleman and Powell to support this contention 369 held that a
creditor is required to conduct a foreclosure sale fairly, and then noted that
Coleman and Powell's complaint was not that FDIC-Receiver's conduct of
the foreclosure sale was unfair but rather than the sale did not occur quickly
enough. 37 0 The court concluded that FDIC-Receiver had no federal common law duty to foreclose its lien expeditiously under the authority cited. 371
The Coleman court also advanced several policy bases for not imposing a
duty of good faith in this case. The court observed that as principals of
Judico, Coleman and Powell were capable of protecting their interests by
362. 795 S.W.2d at 708.
363. TEx. Bus. & COM.

CODE ANN.

§ 1.203 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).

364. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 &

Supp. 1991), §§ 3.101-6.111 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1991), §§ 7.101-9.507 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1991).
365. 795 S.W.2d at 708 (citing, TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(19) (Vernon
1968)).
366. 795 S.W.2d at 708 ("The guarantors' complaint in this case is not that the FDIC was
dishonest, but that it was not diligent. The UCC does not require diligence for good faith.").
367. Id. at 708-09.
368. Id. at 709.
369. Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 1967).
370. 795 S.W.2d at 709.
371. Id.
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having Judico sell the real estate security before it declined further in value,
thereby eliminating or greatly reducing the resulting deficiency. Given their
ability to protect themselves, the court reasoned that Coleman and Powell
should not be permitted to required FDIC-Receiver to protect their inter372
ests.
The court also stated that to impose a duty of good faith in this type
of situation would create an impossible burden, noting "[i]t is difficult
enough to determine when it is best to foreclose to protect one's own interests; it is virtually impossible to know when it is best to protect others' interests."' 373 Last, the court asserted that the imposition of a duty of good faith
under these circumstances would raise material issues of fact in nearly all
deficiency suits, precluding summary judgment and necessitating a full trial
on the merits in most actions to recover deficiencies. The court stated that
commercial transactions require more predictability and certainty than such
374
a rule would afford.

In their dissent from the Coleman holding, 375 three justices argued that
the majority had mischaracterized the duty that Coleman and Powell
claimed was owed to them by FDIC-Receiver. The dissent stated that the
claimed duty was one of commercial reasonableness in the disposition of the
collateral, not one of good faith and fair dealing. 376 The dissent asserted
that, while FDIC-Receiver was not required to proceed against the collateral
before seeking to recover from Coleman and Powell, once it undertook to do
so it was obligated to act in a commercially reasonable manner. 377 The dissent found that Coleman and Powell had presented sufficient evidence at the
summary judgment hearing to put the question of FDIC-Receiver's violation
378
of this duty before a jury.
The Coleman case is significant in that the court refused to recognize any
generalized duty of good faith and fair dealing in the banking transaction
examined. In Coleman, the Texas Supreme Court took a general view of the
existence of such a duty that contrasts with the position taken by Texas
courts of appeals in two cases within the last several years. 379 Although the
Coleman decision in no manner overruled these other cases, Coleman does
illustrate the reluctance of the Texas Supreme Court to find a duty of good
faith and fair dealing, at least in the context of a banking relationship in
which the parties have relatively equal bargaining power. The probable result of Coleman will be to decrease the willingness of Texas courts to find
such a duty in most, if not all, banking relationships.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 710.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 710-12 (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
376. Id. at 710-11.
377. Id. at 712.
378. Id.
379. Cf. Olney Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Farmers Mkt. of Odessa, Inc. 764 S.W.2d 869, 871
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ) (secured lender had duty to make effort to reduce loan and
any resulting deficiency as much as possible by securing fair price for any collateral); Plaza
Nat'l Bank v. Walker, 767 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ) (special
relationship between bank and its depositor imposes implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
toward depositor upon the bank).
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ISSUES

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The case of Executive National Bank v. Board of Governors380 presented
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit with an unusual jurisdictional
issue arising out of the proposed acquisition of a failing bank, Executive National Bank (ENB), by a Mexican banking corporation Bancomer, S.N.C.
(Bancomer).
On February 27, 1989, Bancomer filed an application with the Federal
Reserve Bank in San Francisco requesting approval to acquire ENB. On
March 16, 1989, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the
Federal Reserve) informed Bancomer that its application would not be
processed under the Federal Reserve's emergency powers because a protest
had been filed. 38' The Federal Reserve continued to request information
concerning Bancomer's operations. 38 2 On September 28, 1989, Bancomer's
representatives and Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve's Chairman,
among others, held a meeting at which the Federal Reserve allegedly promised to take action within 30 days. 38 3 On October 18, 1989, Robert Hermann, the Senior Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, contacted the
Federal Reserve, and was allegedly informed that Bancomer's application
would be addressed at one of the Federal Reserve's October Board meetings. 38 4 Bancomer had still not heard from the Federal Reserve when ENB
filed a motion for a declaratory judgment on November 6, 1989.385
ENB contended that the Federal Reserve's inaction was tantamount to a
denial of Bancomer's application. Accordingly, ENB requested the court of
appeals to deem Bancomer's application to be approved under the Federal
Reserve's "91-day rule."'3 86 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Federal Reserve's inaction. 38 7
380. 889 F.2d 556, 557-59 (5th Cir. 1990).
381. Motion for Emergency and Expedited Review on Petition for Review and Request for
Declaratory Judgment at 8-9, Executive Nat'l Bank v. Board of Governors, 889 F.2d 559 (5th

Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Emergency Motion].
One protest, allegedly on behalf of independent bankers, claimed that the acquisition would
be anticompetitive because Bancomer was owned by the Mexican government, and thus, was
able to "draw on Mexico's hard currency reserves to capitalize its U.S. subsidiary." Texas
Bankers Fight Mexican Bid for Bank, Am. Banker, May 22, 1989, at 1, 48, col. I. The protest

also questioned the ability of "regulators to evaluate the financial condition of a state-owned

Mexican institution." Id. This latter concern was apparently shared by the Federal Reserve

because the Federal Reserve devoted considerable time in an effort to determine Bancomer's
financial condition.
382. Emergency Motion supra note 381, at 10-12.

383. Id. at 12-13.
384. Id. at 13.
385. 889 F.2d at 557.

386. Title 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b)(1) provides:
In the event of the failure of the Board [the Federal Reserve] to act on any

application for approval under this section within the ninety-one-day period
which begins on the date of submission to the Board of the complete record on
that application, the application shall be deemed to have been granted.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(b)(1) (1989).
387. 889 F.2d at 558.
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ENB responded that the court possessed jurisdiction, under 12 U.S.C. section 1848.388
In response, the court stated that the Board's conduct did not constitute a
reviewable order. 38 9 If the Federal Reserve had denied the application, then
the court would have possessed jurisdiction. Until the Federal Reserve
reached a decision, however, ENB's (and Bancomer's) only course of action
was to request the district court to grant a declaratory judgment deeming the
application to be approved. Thus, the court dismissed ENB's action for lack
390
of jurisdiction.
B.

Insurance of Accounts

Abdullah Fouad & Sons v. FDIC39 1 involved funds in an account opened
by Allied International Sales Corporation (Allied) in a bank that failed. The
signature card for the account and the corporate resolution attached to it did
not indicate that any party other than Allied had an interest in the account.
The FDIC presumably combined the account with another account or accounts maintained by Allied at the insolvent bank and denied the account in
question independent coverage. Abdullah Fouad & Sons (Fouad) sued the
FDIC, claiming that the account had been opened by Allied as agent for
Fouad thus entitling the account to deposit insurance coverage separate
from any accounts maintained by Allied on its own behalf at the insolvent
bank. The issue addressed by the Fouad court was whether the FDIC's determination regarding coverage was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of
392
discretion.
The court first noted that both statute 39 3 and FDIC regulations 394 provide
388. 12 U.S.C. § 1848 states:
[A]ny party aggrieved by an order of the Board [the Federal Reserve] ... may

obtain a review of such order in the United States Court of Appeals within any
circuit wherein such party has its principal place of business... by filing in the
court, within thirty days after the entry of the Board's order, a petition praying
that the order ...

be set aside.

12 U.S.C.A. § 1848 (1989).
389. 889 F.2d at 558.
390. ENB failed on November 16, 1989.
391. 898 F.2d 482, 483 (5th Cir. 1990).
392. Id.
393. 12 U.S.C. § 1822(c) provides:
Except as otherwise prescribed by the Board of Directors, neither the Corporation nor such new bank or other insured depository institution shall be required to recognize as the owner of any portion of a deposit appearing on the
records of the depository institution in default under a name other than that of
the claimant, any person whose name or interest as such in default owner is not
disclosed on the records of such depository institution in default as part owner
of said deposit, if such recognition would increase the aggregate amount of the
insured deposits in such depository institution in default.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1822(c) (1989).
394. 12 C.F.R. § 330.1(b)(1) provides:
The deposit account records of the insured bank shall be conclusive as to the
existence of any relationship pursuant to which the funds in the account are
deposited and on which a claim for insurance coverage is founded. Examples
would be trustee, agent, custodian or executor. No claim for insurance based on
such a relationship will be recognized in the absence of such disclosure.
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that deposit account records are conclusive in establishing ownership of
funds deposited in an insured bank. 395 While regulations allow the details of

a deposit relationship to be ascertained from other records of the bank or
depositor, 396 the existence of the relationship itself must be discernible from
the account records. 397 Fouad argued that the FDIC had acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in refusing to make an exception and accept evidence regarding the depository relationship when the written records of the bank
were incomplete or inaccurate. 398 The court rejected Fouad's contention,
stating that the FDIC had properly rejected Fouad's attempt to demonstrate
its ownership of the account with evidence from the failed bank's credit files
and statements from the failed bank's former account officers. 399 The court
observed that the exception advocated by Fouad would require the FDIC to
go beyond a failed bank's deposit records in determining insurance coverage,
which requirement would contradict both the relevant statute and
regulations. 400
VI.

CRIMINAL LAW

Increasingly, there seems to be an unfortunate tendency on the part of
courts to impose criminal penalties for violations of civil statutes. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
401 continues
CorderP
this trend. Douglas Cordell (Cordell) was President of
the former American National Bank (ANB), Tyler, Texas. In 1985, ANB
extended credit to Joseph McMurrey (McMurrey) in the aggregate amount
of $150,000. ANB's capital subsequently deteriorated, and the extensions of
credit to McMurrey became "nonconforming" 4°2 with ANB's legal lending
limit. ANB's Board, to avoid any violations of the bank's lending limit, instituted a system to monitor loans, including overdrafts, to borrowers whose
accounts were near the limit.
On April 16, 1987, McMurrey sought to purchase a cashier's check from
ANB funded with the balance of his account at ANB and a check drawn on
Bank of Longview (BOL). Cordell spoke with McMurrey who assured him
12 C.F.R. § 330.1(b)(1) (1990).
395. 898 F.2d at 484.
396. 12 C.F.R. § 330.1(b)(2) provides:

If the deposit account records of an insured bank disclose the existence of a

relationship which may provide a basis for additional insurance, the details of
the relationship and the interests of other parties in the account must be ascertainable either from the records of the bank or the records of the depositor
maintained in good faith and in the regular course of business.
12 C.F.R. § 330.1(b)(2) (1990).
397. 898 F.2d at 484.
398. Id. at 485.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. 912 F.2d 769, 778 (5th Cir. 1990) (Gee, J., dissenting).
402. A nonconforming loan is not a violation of a bank's legal lending limit because, at the
time that loan was made, it was permissible. Accordingly, it is effectively grandfathered. Until
the loan becomes conforming, however, a bank may not extend additional credit to that borrower without violating the legal lending limit. See 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1988).
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that BOL was processing the draw on McMurrey's BOL account. Cordell
then spoke with the secretary to BOL's President who confirmed McMurrey's statement. Cordell agreed to approve McMurrey's cashier's check request only after he received this confirmation.
The next day, however, BOL determined that McMurrey's account did
not contain sufficient funds to cover the check and notified ANB. According
to the court, if ANB gave effect to BOL's action, McMurrey's account
would have reflected an overdraft. 4° 3 The court stated that Cordell attempted to avoid a lending limit violation by returning several checks drawn
by McMurrey. Cordell directed that the proceeds from these checks be
withdrawn from the accounts of the payees and returned to McMurrey's
account. Subsequently, McMurrey paid all of the returned checks. Consequently, ANB never suffered a loss.
The next month an examiner determined that ANB should have reflected
an overdraft in McMurrey's account. The examiner believed that Cordell
attempted to conceal the lending limit violation by reversing the five checks.
The reversal of these checks, however, could not have prevented the lending
limit violation because the violation was complete when the cashier's check
was drawn. Subsequently, Cordell was convicted and charged with misapplication of bank funds 40 4 and making false entries in bank records. 405
403. 912 F.2d at 773-74. The court incorrectly stated that this overdraft caused a lending
limit violation. In reality, a lending limit violation already had occurred when ANB permitted
McMurrey to draw (the cashier's check) on uncollected funds (the BOL draw). See Weinstock, The Legal Lending Limit - A Trapfor the Unwary, 50 Banking Rep., Feb. 2, 1989, at
430 ("The OCC [Comptroller] considers overdrafts and advances offunds against uncollected
balances to be extensions of credit.") (author's emphasis).
404. 18 U.S.C. § 656 provided:
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent or employee of, or connected in any
capacity with any Federal Reserve bank, member bank, national bank or insured bank, or a receiver of a national bank, or any agent or employee of the
receiver, or a Federal Reserve Agent, or an agent or employee of a Federal
Reserve Agent or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds or
credits of such bank or any money, funds, assets or securities intrusted to the
custody or care of such bank, or to the custody or care of any such agent, officer,
director, employee or receiver, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 656 (1988) (emphasis added).
18 U.S.C. § 656 was amended by FIRRA in 1989 to increase the maximum fine from $5,000
to $1,000,000 and the maximum imprisonment penalty from five years to 20 years. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No.
101-73, § 961, 103 Stat. 183, 499 (1989); 12 U.S.C.A. § 656 (Supp. 1990).
405. 18 U.S.C. § 1005 provided:
(MV]hoever makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of such bank
with intent to injure or defraud such bank, or any other company, body politic
or corporate, or any individual person, or to deceive any officer of such bank, or
the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
or any agent or examiner appointed to examine the affairs of such bank, or the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System - shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1988).
18 U.S.C. § 1005 was amended by FIRREA in 1989 to increase the maximum fine from
$5,000 to $1,000,000 and the maximum imprisonment penalty from five years to 20 years. See
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The Cordell court stated that a material omission can support prosecution
for making a false entry. 40 6 The court held that Cordell's failure to book an
overdraft was such an omission.4 0 7 Similarly, the court determined that
Cordell misapplied bank funds when he made the late returns on the checks
in an effort to avoid or conceal a lending limit violation.40 8 According to the
court, these late returns misapplied funds entrusted to ANB.
The dissent noted that the five checks were correctly posted and were not
recorded in a manner designed to avoid detection by the examiners. 4° 9
Cordell made no effort to conceal these entries from the examiners. According to the dissent, it was not a material omission for Cordell to record these
transactions as late returns.4 10 Certainly, Cordell's actions were ill-consid411
ered but they were not criminal.
The majority placed great weight on Regulation J (expedited funds availability), 41 2 pursuant to which ANB already had become responsible for the
five checks when Cordell had them returned. The dissent stated that the
evidence produced at trial concerning the violation of this civil regulation
prejudiced Cordell. 41 3 Moreover, the dissent disagreed that there had been a
misapplication of bank funds even if ANB were responsible for the checks,
under Regulation J, when the checks were returned. 41 4 The dissent would
have overturned the convictions.
Usually, bank officers who are convicted for misapplication of bank funds
received the proceeds of the extension of credit involved. As the dissent
noted, Cordell did not benefit from his actions, 415 nor did he conspire with
McMurrey. In addition, ANB never lost any funds. 41 6 Cordell violated a

civil statute (legal lending limit), for which there are civil enforcement remedies. Admittedly, Cordell's actions were ill-advised, but, as the dissent recognized, that does not make such actions criminal. The extension of federal
bank crime statutes to situations like those in this case is a troubling
development.
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L.
No. 101-73, § 961, 103 Stat. 183, 499-500 (1989); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1005 (Supp. 1990).
406. 912 F.2d at 773 n.8.
407. Id. at 773-74.
408. Id. at 774.
409. Id. at 778.
410. Id. at 778-79.
411. Id.
412. See Regulations J, 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-210.38 (1990).
413. Id. at 779.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 779-80. On first blush it might appear that Cordell was attempting to obtain a
benefit by avoiding a lending limit violation. As discussed earlier, however, the lending limit
violation occurred when Cordell allowed McMurrey to draw on uncollected funds to purchase
the cashier's check. Even if the BOL draw arrived and was deposited, a lending limit violation
had occurred. Accordingly, Cordell did not benefit from the transactions that formed the basis
of the misapplication of bank funds conviction because the lending limit violation was already
complete. See supra note 403.
416. 912 F.2d at 779.
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CONCLUSION

As is evident from this survey, the substantial deterioration of the nation's
financial system experienced during the last several years and the federal
government's response, principally in the form of FIRREA, were responsible for the preponderance of developments in Banking Law in the State of
Texas during the survey period. This trend will likely continue as the nation's financial institutions remain under stress and the powers made available by FIRREA are both exercised by the banking authorities and
challenged by parties affected by such exercise.

